Monetary policy

The paper examines whether monetary policy has similar effects across major states in the Indian polity. Impulse response functions from an estimated Structural Vector Auto Regression (SVAR) reveal two sets of states: a core of states that respond to monetary policy in a significant fashion vis-à-vis others whose response is less significant. The paper attempts to trace the reasons for the differential response of these two sets of states in terms of financial deepening and differential industry mix.

This paper reviews the process of monetary policy formulation, with some stylised facts monetary policy currently pursued. Issues concerning the objectives and conduct with reference to targets and the indicators are discussed. Some possible areas where future research on monetary policy could be focused are also suggested.

While the rationale for raising the interest rate to defend an exchange rate under speculative attack is well grounded in economic and financial theories, empirical validation of the effectiveness of such a policy stance has generally been difficult and is shrouded with conflicting findings. In India, besides forex market interventions and use of several administrative measures, the Reserve Bank of India has occasionally resorted to the high interest rate option during major episodes of significant pressures on the external value of the rupee. An empirical assessment suggests that one standard deviation shock to the call rate leads to rupee appreciation in the very second month. Similarly, for one standard deviation shock to net interventions, the exchange rate appreciates gradually by a few paise over five months. The impulse response also suggests that in response to one standard deviation shock the exchange rate appreciates by about 8 paise in the second month, but subsequently the exchange rate depreciates gradually, more than offsetting the initial impact of the hike in interest rate.

The Reserve Bank of India’s monetary policy announcement for the first half of this fiscal year is very much on the expected lines. There are no dramatic pronouncements on the macroeconomic front – the governor had earlier already ruled out any reduction in the Bank rate or the cash reserve ratio – no big bang reforms, no new announcements on the recent stock market/banking fraud. Nothing to unnerve the markets or unsettle the economy. Instead the policy carries forward the overall reform agenda – albeit in fits and starts – even as it tries to plug the loopholes in the system that have come to light in the context of the latest scam. However, market observers looking to find some admission of regulatory lapse on the part of the RBI are likely to be disappointed. Apart from a brief mention that the policy is being “presented at a time when serious lacunae have emerged in the functioning of certain segments of the financial system”, there is no elaboration of whether the central bank’s own supervisory lapses – of the clearing house or of urban cooperative banks/ commercial banks – contributed to the market operators’ shenanigans.