Federalism

Recent assembly elections test the resilience of India’s federal set-up.

The COVID-19 pandemic has turned out to be the biggest humanitarian disaster of the century. This crisis has been effectuated due to the authoritativeness of the state that has used its powers under the Disaster Management Act, 2005 and the hitherto Epidemic Disease Act, 1897 without paying heed to the decentralisation of powers, devolution of duties, and building community resilience.

In addition to the three-pillar framework suggested by the Fifteenth Finance Commission, we suggest four constituents, namely the finance commission, NITI Aayog, goods and services tax, and de facto decentralisation, which will help strengthen the “cooperative” element—a key factor for Indian federation to work effectively. Further, the article focuses on finance commissions empowering the local governments and, in particular, assesses the Fifteenth Finance Commission’s thrust to empower the local bodies.

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India is considered as a successful federation in resolving most of its ethno-regional and linguistic problems in favour of a relatively durable political order and stability through territorial as well as non-territorial recognition of identity. On the basis of a distinction between what has been termed “diversity claims” and “equality claims,” it is argued that India’s democratic success has remained a very poor match to its federal success. Democracy here has been pressed into the service of a kind of federalism that has privileged “diversity claims” over “equality claims.” Although India’s experiment with state creation within federalism remains ongoing, with Telangana being the latest one carved out of Andhra Pradesh in 2014, given the shifts in priorities since the onset of India’s reforms in 1991, political incentives for demanding more states do not appear to be as attractive as before. While equality claims played second fiddle to diversity claims, the scope of the former has become further restricted today.