

January 20, 1962

### **Adoula and Stanleyville**

MUCH in the Congo hinges on whether Adoula will succeed in gaining control of Stanleyville. The U S administration is barking him for a number of obvious reasons. A fragmented Congo is one in which the Russians might hope to control one or two of the fragments; a united Congo is most likely to remain tied to the West. National integration is, however, unlikely to be achieved from without: the U N Force has proved cumbersome, driven by conflicting influences, constrained by legalities and ineffective in promoting the type of indigenous ruling power which the U S have traditionally looked to us as a base for their operations abroad. If Adoula succeeds, his candidacy for such a role will be strong,

Nor is this all. A united Congo is inconceivable without Katanga; and the re-annexation of Katanga is clearly beyond the power of the U N Force. Too many powerful voices are raised against granting it either the authority or the means to do so. Britain is the major example. Despite his "winds of change" speech in Cape Town in 1960 in which he served notice that British interests in Africa were to shift their anchorage from the white settled minorities to the nascent African ruling class Macmillan has found it difficult to make the transition. The settlers remain powerful. Their stronghold in the Rhodesias is buttressed by South African money, men and moral support. They have the power to make life unbearable for the massive British mining interests whose chain of operations stretch from Katanga and Northern Rhodesia copper to South Africa's gold. They are well represented amongst Tory back-benchers and able to exploit fully the insecurities flowing through that party as Britain eases itself into Europe. For the moment Macmillan's hands are tied: so, too, at one remove, are those of the U N: and Tshombe flourishes, wresting the weds of fragmentation.

But if Adoula succeeds in Stanleyville, the position will have changed. The U S will have reason to press for a switch in the U N's major effort from policing to civil

administration while building up the Leopoldville regime for the advance on Katanga. If round two in the battle for a united Congo comes off, the repercussions might well be felt in places as far apart as Salisbury, Cape Town and London.

What of Delhi? Our troops, were called to help maintain Congolese unity. But times have changed. The U N force is paralysed by disagreement amongst the Western powers, useless as an agent of national integration, it is more than likely to be caught in the conflict between the two Villes. Is it our business to keep the ring while the U S prepares Adoula's coup?

### **Letters to the Editor**

#### **Washington Embassy and Goa**

YOUR correspondent's article, "Coast and the Aftermath", January 6, 1962, was particularly interesting to one who was in the United States of America during "Operation Vijay".

Finding myself in the position of an unexpected apologist for India without much current information at my disposal - except the local press, it was difficult at times to answer entirely satisfactorily some of the "inevitable" objections to which your correspondent has referred.

It would be particularly interesting to know more about the actions and utterances of the Indian Embassy in Washington immediately before and after "Operation Vijay" took place.

If any "hand-outs" were supplied to the press, radio and television networks, they must have been suppressed so effectively that the friends of India were placed at a disadvantage in relation to both innocent and deliberate anti-Indian

V GRENFEELE

Bombay.  
January 10

#### **Traffic Congestion and Laissez Faire**

TRAFFIC congestion in Bombay is had and it is going to get worse. The problem arises because traffic is

run on a *laissez-faire* basis. It will not be corrected until traffic planning is introduced. I would like to suggest a simple planning scheme.

Any driver wishing to make a trip within the Bombay limits shall be required to submit an application to a Traffic Planning Bureau. The application will specify the intended origin and destination, and the preferred time of departure. Applications should be submitted at least 30 days in advance of the day of the trip to allow time for processing.

The Traffic Bureau will, in the light of the total demand, return to each applicant a card specifying the date, the time, and the route that the driver will be permitted. These cards can be attached to the outside of the automobile where police along the way can inspect them to ascertain that the driver is travelling within the authorised route and time limits. Users of taxis can apply for permits to take taxis between specified points at specified times and these permits, can be attached to the side of the taxi before entering.

LADY MOJORIST

New York.  
January 5, 1962

(The motorist can still retain his freedom to *drive* provided he starts with his freedom to *park* his car anywhere he likes. This means not only parking meters and parking lots, municipal or commercial there can never be enough of them — but changes in building regulations to compel builders of posh flats, most of the tenants of which are car-owners, to build garages or provide parking space within the building compound — *Ed.*)

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#### **A Correction**

The author of the article, "Possibilities of Crop Shifts", in the issue of January 13, 1962 is Sharad Chandra Jain and not Sharad Chandra Joshi as was wrongly printed in the table of contents. The error is regretted — Ed.