

# The First Summit

THE New Year begins well with the near-certainty of a Summit at last, Mr Khrushchev has readily agreed to both the time and the place suggested by the Western powers, and all the long discussion on these points has been within the West alone. The Soviet Union has been showing an almost incredible amount of accommodation all along, it has been agreeing with everything the West has suggested including the proposal that the Heads-of-State conference should be limited to the Big Four (although this involved the abandonment by Moscow of its long-held position of east-west parity at the talks). It almost seems that the more reluctant Western powers, like Germany and France, have had to agree to a Summit in spite of themselves: Moscow sustained all their objections and made it impossible for them to oppose the conference any longer.

It is easy, of course, to be suspicions of so much Soviet reasonableness; and there are those who will be tempted to jump to the conclusion that Mr Khrushchev's sweet reasonableness is the outcome of the knowledge that the West will come to the Summit thoroughly divided, and therefore weak (which, indeed, is true). But there is a good case for resisting cynicism of that sort. The Soviet Premier must be fully commended for his new spirit of accommodation until such time as clear evidence is forthcoming to the contrary.

As it happens, there is a sound and logical explanation of the cordial state of Mr Khrushchev's present confidence in himself and the Summit. Perhaps the most important part of this explanation is the concept of a series of summits replacing the concept of one, single Summit on which everything is staked. The Russians are no longer in need of every possible safeguard from the very start, for, after all, the Summit will be only one of many summits in the oiling, and it matters relatively little whether or not the first of the series achieves total success. The same, of course, goes for the West. Mr Eisenhower has travelled a long way since the days when the wry idea of a Summit excited his reluctance, if not opposition. His argument then was that a Summit failure would be

disastrous to the cause of peace, and that a summit conference would therefore be justified only if meetings at a lower level showed that there were distinct chances of succeeding. The American suspicion of Russia, of which these theories were born, died down considerably with the Khrushchev visit to the United States; and in the new spirit of Camp David, the summit acquired a less frightening aspect. On the top of it all, came the wholly praiseworthy and imaginative proposal by the British Prime Minister- Mr Macmillan, that there should be many summits instead of one. That removed the last distrust of the Summit becoming: a gamble.

There is also another reason for the Russian Premier's, confident approach to the Summit next May: he still holds the card of a separate treaty with East Germany in his hands even though he no longer flourishes it noisily. He knows he can play it, if needs be; and he also knows that the West knows he can.

This brings us to the important point of realising that, just because the holding of the Summit is now a near-certainty, it does not by any means signify that the Summit success is a near-certainly too. The

two things are quite separate. Indeed it is the difference between the two which has made the Summit possible. It is not because it is possible that the Summit will come, but because the Summit will come that it is possible. The Summit will be held in May.

From the point of view of the success of the summit, the obvious advantage of the West is a potential advantage, which even if it is not realised, is a gain for the West. The West is any way, in a position to deal with the Soviet Union, and it is not out of the question that the West will be able to deal with the Soviet Union. The West is in a position to deal with the Soviet Union, and it is not out of the question that the West will be able to deal with the Soviet Union. The West is in a position to deal with the Soviet Union, and it is not out of the question that the West will be able to deal with the Soviet Union.

## All over a

THE least that can be said about the strike launched by the B E S & T workers, which has paralysed Bombay's bus and tram services, is that it was avoidable. The differences between the workers and the B E S & T Undertaking had narrowed down to a point where only extraneous considerations, those of prestige particularly, could have prevented a final settlement. The draft of the agreement to be reached had been passed on to the Workers' Union; and though there was some divergence of view on certain details, it was not serious enough to jeopardise the chances of a settlement. Indeed, but for the objection taken by the B E S & T Committee to what has been described as an 'intemperate and offensive' letter from the Union, the withdrawal of which was insisted on as a condition precedent to the signing of the agreement, there should have been no strike at all.

The letter, it appears, accused the Undertaking of following 'Pan Mun

workers' or concern for the convenience of the public.

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As... not e... Under... strike

fore the agreement can be signed. Should they have been cent only on leaching a stern lesson to their none too amiable employees, they could not have done worse. Teaching of a lesson, if found imperative, may well be the privilege of the aggrieved employers; but why should the public have to pay for the privilege in terms of inconvenience, loss of time and exasperation? They certainly do not overflow with sympathy and affection for the B E S & T workers, most of whom are better cared for than employees in similar enterprises and some, at least, of whom are not exactly models of decorous demeanour. The public do not like the strike either: but the circumstance that led to the strike and the new factors that

lend to prolong it are points that they cannot hold against the workers with sufficient justification.

If the B E S & T authorities bank on the possible wrath of the public to chastise the strikers, they are on a sorry quest. As local reports say, the travelling public have taken the paralysis of city transport somewhat philosophically as they have learnt to take many other things as well. But they are not likely to be philosophic enough to desist from laying the blame for the sad developments of the week at the right door. That at least should make the B E S & T authorities climb down a little from their present Olympian stance. unapproachable, uncompromising, all over a trivial letter

### Second Shipbuilding Yard

AMC... the Indu... st... d... After... French firm... compan... has... with a... assistance... Charman... after... french technicians... difficulties... unbalanced... services... the shipyard is... to persuade... to plac... The... on U... parity... attractive for... in shipping... and in... their sites to

should have come up during the Second Plan. Though Shri G L Mehta made it clear that his observations had no relation to the choice of any particular site, a Kerala correspondent scents danger in all this, to deprive his State of the promised shipyard at Cochin. The correspondent writes:

" Shri G L Mehta has admitted that he is not qualified to express any opinion on the merits of the site selected for the second shipbuilding yard. His doubt emanates from the fear whether there would be adequate resources to develop a second shipyard before the first one is put on a sound footing. Secondly, it would appear that he has his own doubts whether it would be a wise policy, at least for the present, to start a second shipbuilding yard in-lead of trying to acquire as many ships as possible with the limited resources that we have, as there is a slump in the world shipping and shipbuilding market.

has many natural advantages over any site in India including Vizag and this is perhaps the only State which had been denied the benefit of any basic industry during tin<sup>1</sup> two Plan periods.

"If Shri Mehta is Convinced of the unsound nature of starting a second shipbuilding said at present, he should have explained in detail how the development at Cochin would retard the progress at Vizag. He should have also explained the economics of buying ships in preference to the starting of a shipbuilding yard, further, it is not certain whether the foreign resource available would always be transferable according to the needs. In other words, if a foreign country is willing to assist India in the establishment of a second shipbuilding yard, it does not follow that the same resources would be available for the first or for the practice of ships in preference to the establishment of a shipbuilding industry and vice versa."

The Kerala correspondent's fears however, may not be groundless, if the foreign exchange estimation becomes such, that the choice is restricted between making the one shipyard we have work better and starting a second one, leaving both unequipped and uneconomic. In that case, sheer logic will ride out the second, but there are obviously other considerations, First, that the foreign exchange position may not be that led, and second, that non-economic considerations may be overwhelming.

a question of getting... orders or of improved... the present basis. As... man sees it, foreign ex... the main bottleneck :

s, after nearly 15 years of... we have not been able to... Shipyard at Viakhapat... a self-sustaining unit. Our energies should therefore be devoted to building ships as cheaply as possible in this Shipyard rather than dissipate our limited resources for putting up another Shipyard."

No second shipyard? The Export Promotion Committee had wanted a third one and the Estimates Committee had endorsed the suggestion. In face the second shipyard

"It is true that our resources are limited for the rate of development which one would wish to have. However, it is difficult to understand why the establishment of a second shipyard should be linked to the developments at Vizag if the Planning commission can find resources for both the schemes. Nor could it be argued that the present slump condition in the shipbuilding market is a sound reason for postponing the establishment of a second shipbuilding yard. If the opinions of experts are to be believed, Cochin