Labour Processes under Economic Reforms

There have been several studies on the impact of neo-liberal policies on labour and employment. This field has been explored by a large number of economists (Harriss-White and Sinha 2007; Seguino 1997; Guenseli and Rodgers 2007; Hirway 2009a, b, 2010; Kantor, Rani and Unni 2006; Nathan 2007). These studies have identified several labour processes taking place in economies after the introduction of neo-liberal policies.

To start with, it is observed that gross domestic product (GDP) growth has been achieved by adopting highly capital-intensive technologies and that the higher the jump an economy has taken in technology, the higher the growth it has achieved. This is primarily because production units have adopted the latest, frontier technologies, which are usually capital-intensive in nature, to be competitive in the global labour market, and also because the increased inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) has brought in highly capitalintensive technologies prevailing in the countries from where the funds come. As a result, the employment generated per unit of output has been declining drastically in these economies. There is nothing wrong in this if the jump in technology is accessible to all sectors of the economy. But this has not happened for want of resources and markets. So one observes a sharp dualism in these economies, where there is a small modern sector enjoying highly capital-intensive technology and high incomes and a large traditional (or non-tradable) sector with low skills, low productivity and low incomes. Apart from being politically and socially unsustainable, this growth is not sustainable economically as well because it is likely to result in an aggregate demand deficiency sooner than later. Alternatively, the growth of the modern sector becomes increasingly dependent on global markets, disregarding the domestic market.

Another labour process identified by experts is that the growth of labour-intensive exports has increased employment opportunities in many developing countries but that the quality of employment is poor. This is because the global market, dominated by global production networks, is under the control of multinational corporations, which keep core activities such as sale, design and finance with themselves while distributing labourintensive production processes among developing countries. These countries, forced to globalise at the lowest end of the value chain, cut their labour costs by reducing wages and not providing social protection so as to survive cut-throat competition and acquire orders from multinational corporations.

Third, rapid industrial growth is usually achieved through destruction of natural resources (that is, overusing natural resources without adequate replenishment) and pollution of air, water and land (in the absence of proper regulation). The adverse impact on natural resources hurts the livelihoods of people as more than 60% of the population in these countries still depend on natural resources for their livelihoods. Finally, the vulnerability of labour has increased considerably under globalisation because the volatility of the global market does not ensure stable jobs to workers and increased competition in the domestic labour market results in closures, down-sizing and restructuring of units. As the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has pointed out, society at present in developing countries is “a risk society” (2004) because most groups, particularly those at the bottom, are exposed to uncertainty and risks that emanate from new policy regimes. Their insecurity is multidimensional – related to employment, income, work, job, and skills.

These labour processes call for carefully designed labour and employment policies to address their negative effects and to promote adequate employment with “decent work”. As the ILO has observed, if the benefits of increase in labour productivity are not passed on to workers, it is likely to create a severe aggregate demand deficiency sooner or later in economies (2010). This paper examines the case of Gujarat, one of the most rapidly growing states in India, to understand the status of labour and employment in the context of the above discussion.

The Case of Gujarat

Gujarat has emerged as one of the fastest growing states under globalisation in India, particularly after 2000, when the rate of growth of state domestic product (SDP) began shooting up. From 2000 to 2008, India’s GDP grew at 7.68 compound annual rate of growth (CARG) while Gujarat’s SDP rose at 10.76 CARG. The secondary sector in the state grew at 11.16% and the tertiary sector at 10.27% during this period, against the corresponding all-India rates of 8.31% and 7.68%. What is worth noting is that agriculture in the state showed a more than 12% annual growth rate during 2000-08 while India struggled hard to achieve even a 3% rate of growth in this sector (Table 1). This growth rate in agriculture has been described by several scholars as a “miracle” and a consequence of “structural changes” in the sector (Shah et al 2009; Datta and Dholakia 2010).

Characteristics of Labour Force

Workforce Participation Rates in Gujarat and India: Gujarat’s workforce participation rates (WPR) were clearly better than India’s (Table 3). In 2007-08, the rural WPR (principal and subsidiary status) in Gujarat was 48.7% against 42.2% in India. Similarly,

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P +SS: principal and subsidiary status. Source: Relevant National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) rounds.

the urban WPR was 37.7% in Gujarat against 35.4% in India. A larger proportion of urban female workers worked as marginal workers in Gujarat compared to India.

Between 1993-94 and 2007-08, the rural WPR in Gujarat remained almost stagnant at 48.7%, while it declined in India from 44.4% in 1993-94 to 42.2% in 2007-08. The urban WPR increased in Gujarat (from 34.7% in 1993-94 to 37.7% in 2007-08) as well as in India (from 34.7% in 1993-94 to 35.4% in 2007-08), the increase in Gujarat being much higher than that in all India.

Unemployment Rates: Gujarat had lower unemployment rates compared to those of India. The rural rates were particularly much lower, 6.0%, 1.0% and 4.0%, respectively for men, women and for both, against the corresponding all-India rates of 10.1%, 4.1%

Table 4: Unemployment Rates in Gujarat and 7.1%, respectively (Table 4). (Principal and Subsidiary Status (in %)

Urban unemployment rates in

Gujarat India

Gujarat, though much higher

Rural

Male 6.0 10.1than those in rural areas, were

Female 1.0 4.1lower than the corresponding

Total 4.0 7.1

all-India rates. The higher urban

Urban

rates can be explained by the

Male 18.0 22.0

fact that people in rural areas

Female 4.0 11.0

were able to take up some work

Total 12.0 17.0 Source: NSSO round 2007-08. or the other involving land, animals or forests (residual sectors) while those in urban areas did not have many residual sectors they could be employed in.

Employment Status of Workforce: Gujarat was in a relatively better position than India with a marginally higher percentage of regular workers among its total workers (2007-08). In the case of urban workers, 42.0% were regular workers against 41.2% in India, and in the case of rural workers, these were 8.0% and 7.3% respectively for Gujarat and India. There was not much difference between the shares of the self-employed and casual workers in Gujarat and India, the shares in India being marginally higher than those in Gujarat.

Between 2004-05 and 2007-08, one finds broadly similar trends in employment status in Gujarat and India (Table 5). In rural areas, a marginal decline in regular workers, an increase in casual workers and a decline in self-employment, all indicating an increase in the share of wage earners. The high rate of growth in agriculture was

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quality of employment seems to be a major problem in Gujarat.

Share of Informal Workers in Total Workers: As is well known, there is a huge gap between the wages, terms of employment and working conditions of formal and informal workers. Formal or organised workers are covered by labour laws that provide social security such as provident funds and pensions, gratuities or severance benefits, medical leave and services under the Employees State Insurance Scheme (ESIS), maternity benefits and bonuses. Laws govern working conditions to ensure safety and security in the workplace and the workers come under the Industrial Relations Act and the Industrial Disputes Act. On the other hand, informal workers are covered only by some scattered labour laws, the benefits of which are low and uncertain. These laws have poor content and coverage and are implemented indifferently by the authorities.

The share of informal workers in total workers in India is 90.68%, 95.93% and 92.38% for men, women and both respectively. The corresponding figures in Gujarat are 88.60%, 97.59% and 91.59%, which implies that though the state is slightly better in the overall share of informal workers in total workers, it lags behind India in terms of women’s share of informal workers in total women workers. Only 2.4% of women workers were in formal employment in Gujarat against 4.07% in India (NCEUS 2008). Kerala was at the top and far ahead of other states with an 81% share of informal workers, followed by Jammu and Kashmir (88%) and Maharashtra (89%). Gujarat, the fastest growing state, ranked 11 among the 20 major states in India in this respect.

It is important to note that formal employment in the public sector has declined in absolute terms in Gujarat, from 8.24 lakh in 2003-04 to 7.98 lakh in 2008-09. This decline has been primarily because the state government has almost frozen recruitment of

Table 5: Employment Status in Gujarat and India (percentage distribution)

staff to reduce public expenditure. As we shall see later, this policy has resulted in a severe shortage of staff in implementing labour laws and labour-related schemes and programmes in the state. Organised or formal employment in the private sector increased in the state from 8.36 lakh in 2003-04 to 11.06 lakh in 2008-09. The overall annual growth of organised employment in the state was only 0.5% during 1995-2008 against a more than 8% growth rate in SDP, and during the high growth period (2000-08), it was 1.6% (Table 6). Though the performance of the private sector during the past five to six years has been positive, the high growth rate in SDP was not really reflected in the growth of organised employment in the state.

1998-99 2001-02 2003-04 2005-06 2007-08 CARD 1998-08 about 8% of the total workforce and were em-

Number of factories 15,455 13,950 12,795 14,055 15,107 -0.23 ployed mainly in non-agricultural ventures,

Fixed capital investment many in skilled or semi-skilled jobs. In the case in industry (Rs) 69,47,655 87,07,855 85,78,858 1,19,53,996 1,45,40,034 7.7

Total invested capital (Rs) 87,61,928 1,11,06,001 1,15,02,721 1,63,97,187 2,09,55,836 9.1

Workers in factory sector 6,07,763 5,21,528 5,38,080 6,69,324 7,97,443 2.8

Capital invested per worker (Rs) 11.43 16.69 15.94 17.85 18.23

Labour/capital 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 -5.83

Wages as % of net value added 11.83 14.96 9.66 7.67 8.52 -3.25 Source: Reports of Annual Survey of Industries. case of male workers and nine in the case of

Recent Amendments in Labour Laws

Though no major reforms have taken place in labour laws in India or in Gujarat since the economic reforms were initiated, some changes in enforcement have been made through Supreme Court judgments as well as changes in some rules, standing orders, and the like by both the central and state governments. These seem to have had a significant impact on labour.

Self-certification cum Consolidated Annual Return Scheme:

The Government of India introduced a provision (December 2003) permitting self-certification by units covered under labour laws. Under this, a unit can make a “self-declaration” in front of a Class II officer that it “follows all the concerned labour laws”. Such units get freedom from routine inspections by the labour department. The main objective behind this provision is to avoid an “inspector raj” and “unnecessary” litigation and to promote a friendly relationship between the labour department and units. As a senior labour officer in Gujarat put it, the government wanted to be a friend, philosopher and guide to the units and promote a healthy relationship.

Under this provision, the labour department in Gujarat is expected to check units every two years to see whether they are complying with labour laws. The department can also receive complaints from workers or the parties concerned if the laws are violated. So far, only 232 of about 35,000 factories and 12 lakh units in the state registered under the Shops and Establishment Act have opted for “self-certification”. It appears that self-certification is not very popular in Gujarat (and also in India), whatever be the reasons. So “inspection” remains a major task for the government and it needs an adequate number of officers and staff for this purpose.

Labour Judiciary: No Work, No Pay: Another major change with far-reaching consequences has come through a judgment of the Supreme Court regarding termination of employment. According to this, if a worker is terminated illegally and reinstated by the employer after an order of a labour court, he or she is not entitled to any payment for the period for which he or she was terminated. That is, “no work, no pay” even for an illegally terminated worker. This is not justifiable because units can now throw workers out illegally without worrying about the payment of back wages if they are reinstated. What is worse, workers are not likely to go to the labour court because they do not have enough money to pay a lawyer. In other words, no worker is in a position to fight if he or she is illegally terminated.

This judgment has also weakened trade unions because workers do not have the money to pay unions to protect their rights. The only beneficiary is the management, which has the freedom of throwing workers out without worrying about their reinstatement.

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Amendment to Industrial Dispute Act 1947 for SEZs: A major amendment has been made to Chapter V-D of the Industrial Dispute Act 1947. According to this, workers employed in special economic zones (SEZs) do not have the right to complain if they are thrown out of their jobs. However, they will get retrenchment compensation of 45 days for a year of work rather than the 15 days given to other workers. This amendment gives units in SEZs the freedom to get rid of workers when it suits them and also weakens the power of workers to fight against illegal retrenchment.

Insertion of the Term ‘Fixed Term Employment’ in the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act 1946: According to an amendment to the Standing Orders, a new term “fixed term employment” has been introduced in the Industrial Employment Act. It allows units to employ workers for “fixed terms”. These workers are not “contract workers” but are still workers employed on contracts. The permission given to employers to appoint workers for fixed terms implies that the earlier employment security of workers is no longer there. The amendment is reasonable if one considers that units frequently need workers for short periods and not on a permanent basis. However, with no employment security, workers need adequate opportunities to find alternative employment in the labour market.

Reduction in the Number of Registers to be Kept under Labour Laws: Another major change is the reduction in the number of registers to be maintained under labour laws to two. This is meant to reduce the number of “inspectors” and weaken “inspector raj”.

On the whole, the above amendments provide more flexibility to production units in the state and favour employers more than employees.

Enforcement of Labour Laws: Labour Department

One observes that the capability of the labour department in Gujarat to enforce labour laws is far from adequate. It has declined considerably in the past two decades. The Directorate of Industrial Safety and Occupational Health, the organisation in charge of enforcement of labour laws in both the organised and unorganised sectors, suffers from a severe shortage of staff. The requirement of labour officers for only the factory sector in the state, as per ILO norms, is 232 (one labour officer per 150 factories, and there are 34,860 factories). Against this, the sanctioned posts are 154 (Class I and II) officers, which is two-thirds of the requirement. Of these, 46 posts (30% of the sanctioned posts) have been vacant for the past year or more (2010). With the ever rising number of factories, as well as the expanded purview of the directorate over unorganised units and its mandate to pay special attention to chemical factories in the state, the existing staff strength is far from adequate. There is also a severe shortage of Class III and IV staff, where 30% of the sanctioned posts are vacant (2010). As was pointed out by a senior officer, their job is now “fire fighting” and “crisis management”, not enforcing labour laws.

In spite of the rising number of factories and non-factory industrial units in Bhavnagar and Junagadh divisions, for example, there is no full-time labour officer in these divisions (2010). Similarly, Surat and its surrounding region is a major industrial centre

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To summarise, the labour department has accomplished only a fraction of what it was required to.

Unorganised Workers’ Board

The government of Gujarat is one of the few state governments in India to set up an Unorganised Workers Board for unorganised or informal workers in the state. This board was set up in 2007 with the objective of protecting the interests of workers employed in nonagricultural units in the state. It covers more than 30 lakh workers employed in a variety of unorganised ventures in the state. The budget of the board was Rs 50 lakh in 2007-08 and Rs 16.70 lakh in 2009-10. The total number of sanctioned posts of officers under this board was 66, 11 in the head office at Ahmedabad and 55 in the four divisions in the state. In 2010, the sanctioned posts were 106, against which only 66 were filled (Government of Gujarat website).

The main task of the board, as decided officially, is to help workers in accessing schemes related to health, providing health checkups in health camps, helping skill development (up to Rs 1,000 per worker) and providing tool kit assistance (up to Rs 300 per worker). So far 42,447 workers have been registered under the board. In all, Rs 27.7 lakh was spent on 3,247 workers (Rs 853 per worker) in 2008-09 and Rs 28.67 lakh on 7,408 workers in 2009-10 (Rs 387.03 per worker). It is very evident that the board has not yet been able to make much of an impact on unorganised workers in the state.

Source: Website of Labour Commissionerate, Government of Gujarat (2010).

Rural Labour Commissionerate

Once again, Gujarat was one of the first states in India to set up a Rural Labour Commissionerate in 1981 to take various measures “to improve the conditions of unorganised rural labour and to protect them against exploitation and malpractices of their employers” (RLC website). The Rural Workers Welfare Board was set up under the Commissionerate to carry out its activities in an autonomous manner. In the initial years, the board was entrusted with a number of activities, which included enforcing the relevant labour laws, implementing different social security and welfare schemes and promoting organisations of rural workers. Honorary rural organisers were appointed to educate and promote organisation of workers, to enforce labour laws and implement welfare schemes through Rural Workers Welfare Centres set up all over the state. At present, however, the Rural Workers Welfare Board is no more involved in activities to organise workers. It has 359 Rural Workers Welfare Centres spread over the state, each headed by an honorary worker (45 centres do not have a head now). An honorary worker is not a full-time worker, and his or her job is to help rural labour in accessing social security schemes.7

The Rural Labour Commissionerate is entrusted with the responsibility of implementing the following Acts in rural areas – the Minimum Wages Act 1948, the Bonded Labour (Abolition) Act 1976, the Equal Remuneration Act 1976, the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act 1986 and Inter-State Migrant

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Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Services) Act 1979. In 1981, according to the norms, a government labour officer (GLO) was appointed at the district level and one assistant GLO at the block level under the assumption that there were about 10,000 agricultural labourers in each block. At present, there are 26 districts and 225 blocks and about 85 lakh agricultural workers in the state. However, there are only 20 GLOs and 92 assistant GLOs against the 26 GLOs and 225 assistant GLOs required (or 850 as per the norms of the Satem Committee).

The Minimum Wages Act covers 13 occupations in rural areas, which include more than 85 lakh workers. The prevalent average daily wage rate of Rs 68 for casual workers (NSSO 2007-08) against the legal rate of Rs 100 a day8 clearly indicates large-scale violation of the Act. However, the total inspections carried out were 84,610 in 2009-10 (91,921 in 2008-09), which again was a minuscule part of what was required. In all, 46 prosecutions were launched in the case of agricultural workers and 104 for other rural workers. No evaluation has been conducted on the enforcement of minimum wages in rural areas (and in all the state) by an official or outside agency. No data on prevailing wage rates are collected by the government through its agencies or non-government ones.

The activities of the Rural Labour Commissionerate have been on a subdued scale. During the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2002-07), Rs 2,127 lakh was spent and 2,073 workers were benefited through different schemes. In the Eleventh Plan, the total outlay of the Rural Labour Commissionerate is Rs 2,550 lakh. In a nutshell, with limited funds and limited staff, not much is being done in terms of either enforcing labour laws or implementing welfare schemes.

Global Crisis and the Diamond Industry

It would be useful in this context to examine how unprotected (global) workers in the state managed during the recent global crisis (2009). A study on the impact of the global crisis on workers and small producers in the diamond cutting and polishing industry in Gujarat (Hirway 2009a, b) is used here for the purpose. Diamond cutting and polishing is one of the most globalised industries in India as its main raw material, raw diamond, is imported and 75% to 80% of the polished diamonds are exported. The share of diamonds in the total commodity exports from India is 12.4% (Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy 2008). About 80% of the diamond cutting and polishing in the country is done in Gujarat. Since this industry exports a large part of the finished diamonds to the European Union and North America, the global crisis severely affected it and its workers.

The study showed that about 45% of the industry’s workers lost their jobs while 55% had less work at lower wages in the same industry (Hirway 2009a, b). Though one-third of the workers who lost jobs took up whatever alternative work was available, the remaining remained unemployed. Their wages fell by 48% and monthly incomes by about 50%. In the process, many workers experienced a decline in their employment status (from regular workers to casual workers) and moved from skilled to unskilled work, implying a loss of skills for the economy. The help received from the government, the industry association and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in this crisis was limited in both content and coverage. Though 30% of the workers received some assistance in cash or kind, it was far from adequate. Help in finding new jobs was available to hardly 10% of the workers, that too through friends and relatives. In sum, the vast majority of these unprotected workers were left to fend for themselves.

The coping strategies of these workers included pawning or selling assets and borrowing at high rates of interest. When this proved inadequate, they drastically cut down on consumption. About 80% of the households reduced their food consumption; 84% reduced expenses on education by withdrawing children (mainly girls) from school or sending children to cheaper schools; and two-thirds of the households reduced their health expenditure by avoiding going to hospitals. The workers suffered from not eating enough, leading to increased poverty and a slow down in human development. About 25% of the workers, who migrated back to their villages, found themselves worse off with few employment opportunities, lower wage rates and lower incomes, and poor infrastructure for their families. Besides, they were depressing village economies by not sending remittances and depressing local wage rates by competing for jobs. The projects under the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) did not offer them much relief.

Women bore the brunt of the crisis. More than two-thirds of the households sent women members to work, 17% for part-time work and 51% for full-time work. Most of these women took up whatever work was available, which meant low productivity, low-wage work. About a fourth of the households reported an increase in unpaid work by women – a number of market activities entered the domestic sphere, significantly increasing the burden of women. In addition, women were subject to increased tensions, domestic violence and depression. There was neither data nor measures to bail out women, who, as producers, wage earners and home makers, endured a heavy burden during the crisis.

Small producers suffered the most among the producers because they were the worst hit by the credit crunch. Since they did not directly deal with exports and imports, the crisis was passed on to them by large producers. Hirway’s 2009(a,b) study draws attention to the plight of workers in this globalised sector in a globalised state. It exposes the weaknesses and critical gaps in the policies pertaining to labour and small producers on the one hand and in trade and industrial policies on the other hand.

The absence of data became an obstacle to reaching affected workers because there were no proper records of diamond units or workers with the government. Though there were more than 7,000 to 10,000 diamond cutting and polishing units in Gujarat and though by an order of the Gujarat High Court they were all covered by the Factories Act, only 521 units were registered under the Factories Act. The main reason for this is that producers did not want to give their workers the benefits of social protection and did not want working conditions to be regulated by the government.

Even after the crisis, the state government has done nothing in this area. Perhaps the most impressive achievement was that the number of registered diamond units increased insignificantly from 532 to 555 in 2009. The important point is that with improving global markets, the diamond industry has begun growing again but no lesson has been learnt. There has been no providing social protection to workers, no ensuring them a right to basic education and primary health and no minimum support for small producers.

Emerging Issues

The discussion above has drawn attention to the plight of labour, in both the formal and informal sectors, in globalising Gujarat. It is clear that labour in the state is basically viewed as a mere factor of production to promote economic growth – and to inflate the profit margins of the corporate sector and promote reinvestment of savings. However, this has adversely affected the economy and the well-being of people in multiple ways, raising several critical issues for policymakers.

Slipping in Poverty Reduction, Human Development and Hunger Indices: There is now enough evidence to show that Gujarat’s performance in poverty reduction and human development in the recent years has been quite poor compared to other Indian states, which are growing at a much lower rate than it is. Though the WPR in Gujarat is better compared to other states, the employment generated is of poor quality, resulting in the state slipping in poverty reduction and human development.

According to official data, the elasticity of poverty reduction to growth was -0.32 in Gujarat during 1993-2005, with the state ranking 14 among the 20 major states in poverty reduction. That is, 13 states were ahead of Gujarat in poverty reduction though they were behind it in growth of SDP. The state slipped from the 8th to 12th rank in rural poverty and from 6th to 8th rank in overall poverty (Planning Commission 2009). In the human development index, the state slipped from the 5th rank in 1996 (HDI of 0.550) to the 9th rank in 2006 (HDI of 0.643) (Government of India 2008). In the health index, the state slipped from the 9th rank to 10th, while in the education index it slipped from the 7th rank to 8th among the 20 major states in India.

The relatively high percentage of working poor in the state is also reflected in the hunger index. According to the recently released report on Global Hunger Index brought out by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington DC, India ranks 66 among the 88 countries for which the index has been prepared. The report also notes that the five worst performing states in India are Gujarat, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. Gujarat is in the “alarming Category”, and ranks 13 among 17 major Indian states for which the index has been compiled (IFPRI 2009).

Datta, Samar K and Ravindra H Dholakia (2010): High Growth Trajectory and Structural Changes in Gujarat Agriculture (Bangalore: Macmillan).

Government of Gujarat: Gujarat Industrial Policy Declarations in 2000, 2003 and 2009, Department of Industry, Government of Gujarat, Gandhinagar.

Guenseli, Berik and Yana van der Meulen Rodgers (2007): “The Debate on Labour Standards and International Trade: Lessons from Cambodia and Bangladesh”, Working Paper No 2007-03, University of Utah.

Hariss-White, Barbara and Anushree Sinha (2007):

Trade Liberalisation and India’s Informal Economy

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Hirway, Indira (2009a): “Global Economic Crisis: Impact on the Poor in India: A Synthesis of Sector Studies”, Discussion paper, Lasting Solutions for Development Challenges, UNDP, New Delhi.

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International Labour Organisation (2004): “Economic Security for a Better World”, ILO Socio-economic Security Programme, ILO report, Geneva.

– (2010): “Building on Employment-Oriented Framework for Strong, Sustainable and BalancedGrowth”, paper presented at the ILO-IMF Joint Conference on the Challenges of Growth, Employment and Social Cohesion, 12 September, Oslo, Norway.

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– (2009): “Challenge of Employment: Informal Economy Perspective”, Report (New Delhi: National Commission for Enterprises in Unorganised Sector).

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Save the Children (2010): “Child Labour in Gujarat, A Discussion Paper”, Office of Save the Children, New Delhi, Also was material for a public hearing on 10 December 2010 in Ahmedabad.

Shah, Tushar, Ashok Gulati, Hemant P, Ganga Shreedhar and R C Jain (2009): “Secret of Gujarat’s Agrarian Miracle after 2000”, Review of Agriculture, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 44, No 52, December.

Shukla, Rajesh (2010): “The Official Poor in India Summed Up”, Indian Journal of Human Development, Vol 4, No 2.

Seguino, Stephanie (1997): “Gender Wage Inequality and Export-Led Growth in South Korea”, Journal of Development Studies, 34, pp 102-32.

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