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displaced and felt threatened at the shrinking political space for them in the BSP. In the 60 parties, we find that Muslim support for SP was double the support for BSP in 2012 (BSP: 20, SP: 39) (Figure 1).

Mayawati, however, lost votes among the MBCs as well. This was attributed to the expulsion of Babu Singh Kushwaha, a MBC leader who was the minister of health and family welfare earlier in Mayawati’s cabinet, following his involvement in a National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) related scam. Kushwaha, the BSP’s “most backward” face since the days of Kanshi Ram was known for his organisational abilities and hold over large sections from the Kushwaha, Maurya, Pal, Shakya, welfare sphere as well, her government could not do enough

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for the dalit community. The Balmiki community – many of whom are engaged in jobs such

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as scavenging and sanitation – felt betrayed by the govern

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ment’s policies, such as those related to government recruitment for such jobs, of which 25% were provided to brahmins and other upper castes (who in turn outsourced to the Balmikis, paying them miserly sums). Survey results showed that the Balmiki community’s vote share for the BSP dropped 40% since 2007. In fact dalits from every class segment, irrespective of gender, age or attained levels of education, voted against the BSP (Table 4).

Table 3: BSP Vote Share in 2007 and 2012 Assembly Elections

East UP 81 13 -40 27.9 -5.1

West UP 44 17 -6 29.2 -0.3

drop in vote share among these commu-

Bundelkhand 19 7 -7 26.2 -7.0

Jat 13 +13 16 +3

nities for the BSP was about 9%.

East UP North 61 9 -15 22.7 -4.7

Yadav 8 +3 11 +3

Total 403 80 -126 25.9 -4.5

Source: Survey data, UP Assembly Election Studies 2007 and 2012, CSDS, Delhi.

However, a closer look at the caste profiles of the BSP voters (Table 3) provides a more nuanced reading. Mayawati’s social engineering project in order to

Kurmi 16 +6 19 +3

MBCs 28 +9 19 -9

Jatav/Chamar 85 +6 62 -23

Muslims 17 +7 20 +3

Source: CSDS Data Unit, UP Assembly Election Studies 2007 and 2012.

Table 4: Category-wise Dalits Who Voted BSP

The National Parties’ Performance

The Congress had pinned its hopes on the popularity of its party general secretary and Amethi Member of Parliament, Rahul Gandhi. He had visited various regions – Bundelkhand in particular

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in almost all caste groups as compared to 2007 (Table 6: column 5). Actually, the Congress had already shown such increases in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections itself (Table 6: col 3). Since then the party has come into the reckoning once again in UP politics and Rahul Gandhi has become almost a household name even in rural UP.

Table 5: Congress Performance in Different Subregions of UP (2012)

Regions Total Seats Gain/ Vote Gain/ Loss Seats Won Loss Seat % Vote % 2007-12 2007-12

Ruhelkhand 52 2 +1 10.7 +2.2

Awadh 73 4 -4 14.1 +2.6

East UP 81 4 +3 8.1 +2.4

West UP 44 5 +4 14.4 +6.8

Doab 73 2 -1 9.4 +1.5

Bundelkhand 19 4 +1 18.6 +5.3

East UP north 61 7 +2 12.2 +3.2

Total 403 28 +6 11.6 +3.0

Source: ECI Data, CSDS Data Unit, Delhi.

Lok Sabha Elections 2009.

Yet, the party could not substantially capitalise on the increase in support in the Lok Sabha elections in 2009 due to irrational allocation of tickets, and poor organisational presence. Various sections among the dalits, for example, showed an inclination to vote for the Congress, but poor candidate choice put them off. In fact, reports suggest that dalits shifted their support to the SP instead of voting for the Congress in various places. That was true of other castes too. The Congress’ loss suggest that the era of winning elections through the cosmetic interventions by charismatic persona and the machinations of the

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national party’s high command is over, and that also signals a maturing of electorate in UP.

The Congress folly of attracting Muslims through the politics of quotas also proved to be disastrous as it had the undesired impact of communalising the issue of reservations. Muslims thought that they will have to compete with other minorities – Christians, Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists, Parsis, etc, in the 4.5% quota for jobs and admissions in educational institutions, while Other Backward Cla sses (OBCs) thought that Congress was trying to reduce their share from 27% to 22.5% in reservations. Thus, Congress suffered a double loss in potential votes; it failed to attract Muslims; it also annoyed OBCs who had voted in big numbers for the party in the Lok Sabha elections in 2009. The Congress vote share in 2012

was down by 7 percentage points among Muslims and subs tantially in OBCs (Jats -2%, Yadavs -7%, Kurmis -15%, mbcs v -5%).

The BJP performed poorly losing both seats (-4) and votes (a drop of 1.97% since 2007). Its maximum losses were in the Doab (from Fatehpur to Aligarh). It did better in Bundelkhand where it won three seats and its vote share was up by 5.7 percentage points may be because of the local infl uence of Uma Bharati who led the party at the hustings. However, it also proves that

such cosmetic tactics as importing leaders from outside may not work now in Indian politics.

The BJP voters’ social profile does not look impressive; the party lost support in almost all sections of the society, though registering very small accretions in support among Yadavs (+4), Jatavs (+2) and Muslims (+4) (Table 7). A vote share of 7% among Muslims, according to the CSDS survey, shows that there is a possibility of rapprochement between the party and the minorities in the future.

This election is a pointer to a few trends in UP politics. One, it is signalling

Table 7: BJP’S Vote Share in 2007 and 2012 Assembly Elections

Assembly Assembly Gain/loss Elections (2007) Elections (2012)

Castes Vote Share Vote Share +/-

Brahmin 43 38 -5

Thakur 46 29 -17

Vaishya 49 42 -7

Upper caste 40 17 -23

Jat 23 7 -16

Yadav 5 9 +4

Kurmi 36 20 -16

MBCs 18 17 -1

Jatav/Chamar 3 5 +2

Muslims 3 7 +4

Source: UP Assembly Election Studies 2007 and 2012, CSDS Data Unit, Delhi .

the end of the era of fractured mandate that plagued the state since 1989, and the formation of governments by parties with clear majorities. Mayawati got an absolute majority in 2007, and Akhilesh Yadav had emulated her as he became the youngest chief minister of UP this time in 2012. The state is moving away from exclusionary caste politics relatively – a trend that started in 2007 and parties are seemingly willing to forgo a kind of politics that fragmented the electorate, warranted post-poll coalitions, and resulted in non-performing unstable governments. The UP voter is moving away from a “marriage model” of voting behaviour to a “share market model” which means that voters are no more wedded to a party and are willing to vote for a party that may provide them greater returns. The Yadavs voting against the SP and the Jatavs voting against the BSP exemplifies this. We also see a tactical shift in Muslim voting behaviour; earlier it was BJP centric “negative vote” as they voted a party that could defeat the BJP. Now Muslims seem to exercise their franchise with a positive orientation to elect the party they perceive will act best in their interests. And, finally, there appears to be a transition from caste to class in the determination of voter support. Though this determination seems to be in a early stage, the coalescing of subalterns, cutting across party affiliations is very much in the offi ng.

Note

1 Based on figures, there seem to be a good correlation between the CSDS survey fi gures and the actual vote shares won by various parties.