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which won 219 seats for the Lower House in a fraud-plagued 2010 general elections that the NLD boycotted. And he did stand to benefit from another peculiarity of Mynamar’s 2008 constitution: the bloc of 110 non-elected military offices guaranteed seats in parliament, ensuring the pro-military faction having 329 seats. So when the bespectacled Thein Sein began his term last March as the head of a quasi-civilian administration, Burmese political activists were quick to refer to him as a “puppet” of Than Shwe. His inaugural speech was similarly derided despite its progressive tone that hinted at the politics of inclusion and the spirit of reform.

Yet six months into Thein Sein’s administration, the tone of reform was hard to ignore. It challenged the conventional wisdom that had prevailed for decades in describing the politics of Myanmar – one of absolutes, a clear black vs white scenario, a tussle between the evil generals and a living saint fighting for democracy. While the president’s assurances could have been dismissed as cosmetic, how could the words of Suu Kyi be avoided? Who better than her could judge the sincerity of Thein Sein as a reformer? And she certainly appeared convinced when, in mid-September, she told journalists: “The past situation is the past. The current situation is the current one and there has been some progress.” They are lines that have come to define the role she has assumed as an ally to the quiet spoken Thein Sein as he presses ahead with change.

The picture that has subsequently emerged to explain the country’s journey towards openness is one that should be familiar to Asians. It is shaped more by personalities than institutions; it is based on faith, trust and confi dence shared by the leading lights in the political firmament – in this case Suu Kyi and Thein Sein. And political insiders point to a day last year, 19 August which is pivotal to understand the beginnings of this alliance. For not only had Suu Kyi been extended a rare invitation to participate in an economic seminar in Naypidaw, the new capital, on that date. Not only did she accept to travel to Naypidaw to mingle for the first time in public with members of the Thein Sein administration, but there was also a private dinner she had been invited to. It was hosted by the president in his residence. The tone at that dinner and the assurances that Thein Sein had promised are said to have convinced Suu Kyi to deliver the line to her supporters that Myanmar was moving beyond the age of juntas.

But it was not a sea change that was easily accepted. There were sceptics among Suu Kyi’s followers. Commentaries in the media outlets run by Myanmar exiles expressed concern. Is “The Lady”, as Suu Kyi is also called, being fooled into an embarrassing political compromise? Some western analysts even dismissed Suu Kyi and her knowledge of her countrymen. These views often touched on benchmarks to gauge the sincerity of the Thein Sein administration. Amnesty for the nearly 2,000 political prisoners languishing in the 44 jails and labour camps was one of them. The ending of the country’s crippling media censorship was another. And then there were the freedoms for the NLD: to be able to function openly as a party, including Suu Kyi being eligible to contest the April by-elections along with other NLD candidates.

Support from Dissidents

By March, Thein Sein had fortifi ed Suu Kyi’s faith in him by delivering on a raft of pledges. Over 1,000 political prisoners had been released, media were given more freedom and the formal return of the NLD was evident in the presence of its ubiquitous symbol, the party’s flag – a fi ghting yellow peacock with a white star on a red background. The reactions of prominent dissidents released from prison – known as the 88 Generation Students Group – described the new Myanmar they were returning to after years in isolation. At a press conference, they declared in a statement: “(The 88 Generation) will participate to the fullest extent with the government led by the president, parliament, military, political parties and ethnic minority groups for the emergence of democracy, peace and development”. A similar spirit of reconciliation emerged following talks between the government and rebel groups from Myanmar’s ethnic minorities who have been waging separatist wars for decades. “Over the course of the past year, rapid progress has been made in reaching preliminary ceasefire agreements with nearly all ethnic armed groups in the country”, noted the Brussels-based think tank, the International Crisis Group, in a mid-April report, titled “Reform in Myanmar

– One Year On”.

It is inevitable that questions would be posed to understand a man being compared with Mikhail Gorbachev, Is Thein Sein the principle architect of Myanmar’s reforms? What motivated him? Were there signs of his moderate outlook even during the years he served under the last junta? Not all questions have been properly answered; there are gaps that remain beyond the reach of some of Myanmar’s most informed analysts. But of what has seeped out from military records from his past and the decisions made while serving the strongman Than Shwe, Thein Sein cuts a fi gure driven more by propriety than power. “He had a reputation for being obedient, a good manager, modest and less ambitious and less corrupt than other officers in the army”, says Win Min, a Myanmar academic specialising in the country’s military affairs. Of his army experience, less is known. Yet he had demonstrated a streak of assertiveness later in life when, as the prime minister for the recalcitrant Than Shwe, he pressed for international assistance to be permitted into Myanmar to aid the victims of the devastating cyclone Nargis, which struck in May 2008, killing over 1,50,000 people. This move was not lost on the likes of the late Nay Win Maung, a prominent fi gure in an emerging civil society movement in the country. He had described Thein Sein as “smart” and “pragmatic” in an exchange with US embassy offi cials in Yangon. The contents of that discussion, which made it to a confi dential cable that the diplomats sent to Washington in June 2008, was subsequently revealed in the WikiLeaks exposures. It stated: “Nay Win Maung said it was Prime Minister Thein Sein who had appealed to Than Shwe to secure the Senior General’s permission to allow international and

Economic & Political Weekly

COMMENTARY

humanitarian staff to travel to (Nargis) affected areas”.

Behind the Change

But those familiar with countries that made transitions from military rule to democracy are bound to ask what local currents in Myanmar made Thein Sein’s role as a catalyst possible. A place to explore this line of inquiry would be the state of the country’s economy. It is in a shambles. This collapse of a nation that was once the world’s leading rice exporter to become a least developed country was the result of decades-long interference by the military in the economy. For unlike in, say, Indonesia, where a coup in the 1960s saw the military rulers control only the political space, in Burma of that same decade, the fi rst military dictator, Ne Win, placed banks, industries and international trade under the military’s command. And 50 years later, public resentment towards the military mismanaging the economy had become palpable. And efforts by Than Shwe to seek an economic lifeline from China in the wake of sanctions imposed by the United States and European governments triggered another sentiment in the national psyche: patriotism and nationalism. The recent years saw growing concern and resentment – even among sections of the military elite – about the dominance of China’s footprint in the country, with the Asian giant emerging as the largest investor ($14 billion) and the largest trading partner ($5.2 billion). And then there were regional reminders that Myanmar was falling behind countries like Vietnam in development. Yet the emerging forces who were pressing for economic reform – that included moderates in the military and a growing civil society – faced a moment of truth: political reform was a prerequisite for Myanmar to find an answer to its economic woes. If it needed trade and investment from the west to help it rise up and to also serve as a counterweight to China’s dominance, power had to shift from the barracks to the legislature.

Yet to draw from all this that Myanmar’s march out of its military past is certain and that the country’s return to civilian rule is on the horizon is to ignore the proverbial elephant in the room. There are powerful former military offi cers and serving ones who refuse to fade away. Vice President Tin Aung Myint Oo, a former general, is a hawk, as is Htay Oo, a former major general, who as the general secretary of the USDP has been disgruntled at the pace of change. And then there is general Min Aung Hlaing, the commander-in-chief of the country’s over 4,00,000 strong armed forces. During a speech in late March, he fired a broadside at Suu Kyi, who has pledged to use her party’s presence in parliament to amend the constitution. The military has a role to defend the constitution and to continue its role in national politics, he said.

Changing the Constitution

So it all comes down to one fact: Changing Myanmar’s current constitution is the final frontier. It was drafted to protect the military and ensure that its grip on power is perpetuated. Where else but only in a country run for and by generals is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces guaranteed a role in the constitution to appoint the ministers of defence, home affairs and border affairs. Where else but in a county under the grip of a military that the powers of a parliament are brazenly undermined by the constitution recognising an even more powerful body – the national defence and security council. The latter’s 11 members – including the president, two vice presidents, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the vice commander and four ministers, three of whom are appointed by the armed forces’ chief – have been given legitimacy to suspend parliament and take over power in the event of a national emergency. In other words, a junta waiting to step in.

It explains why, more than Suu Kyi, the hope for a new Myanmar rests largely on the shoulders of Thein Sein. He has won the support of the moderates within the military faction, the increasingly assertive Lower House speaker Shwe Mann among them. And in these early, fragile days of change, the authority of the man who reluctantly accepted the mantle of president is also respected by the hawks. Yet will Thein Sein be able to deepen the reforms he is presiding over, ushering in a greater civilian presence in political life? Will he achieve peace in the northern Myanmar, where government troops are fighting ethnic Kachin rebels? Will the tone he has set resonate louder by 2015, the year of the next general elections? These are questions that even Myanmar’s best astrologers may not hazard an answer.

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