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Rebalancing the Chinese Economy

China has tried to correct the imbalances in its external sector in a number of ways, but all the efforts have failed to address the direct cause of the rapid increase in foreign exchange reserves. To stop the accumulation of reserves and thus minimise China's welfare and capital losses, the simplest solution would be for the People's Bank of China to end intervention in the foreign exchange market. Ending central bank intervention in currency markets is a complex issue. But the economic and welfare costs of China's slow pace in adjusting the exchange rate are very high and will only increase by the day. It is time for China to consider allowing the yuan to float freely, while reserving the right to intervene when it must, and tighten the management of cross-border capital flows which has become permissible under the Group of 20's agreements.

SPECIAL ARTICLE

Rebalancing the Chinese Economy

Yu Yongding

China has tried to correct the imbalances in its external sector in a number of ways, but all the efforts have failed to address the direct cause of the rapid increase in foreign exchange reserves. To stop the accumulation of reserves and thus minimise China’s welfare and capital losses, the simplest solution would be for the People’s Bank of China to end intervention in the foreign exchange market. Ending central bank intervention in currency markets is a complex issue. But the economic and welfare costs of China’s slow pace in adjusting the exchange rate are very high and will only increase by the day. It is time for China to consider allowing the yuan to float freely, while reserving the right to intervene when it must, and tighten the management of cross-border capital flows which has become permissible under the Group of 20’s agreements.

This is a revised version of the Exim Bank Commencement Day Lecture 2011 delivered in Mumbai on 27 July.

Yu Yongding (yongdingyu@gmail.com) is a member of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, president of the China Society of World Economics and was a member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the People’s Bank of China.

A
fter 30 years of breakneck growth, China overtook Japan in 2010 to become the world’s second largest economy. At the same time, China became the world’s largest trading nation and the largest holder of foreign exchange reserves. In 2010, China’s income per capita surpassed the $4,000 middle-income threshold. There is no doubt whatsoever that China’s achievement has been incredible; it has indeed been a miracle.

However, China’s growth is, as seen by Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, “unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated and ultimately unsustainable”. Throughout history, there are countless examples of middle-income countries that get stuck in that category for decades or eventually fall back to low-income status. The Nobel Laureate economist Michael Spence has pointed out that after the second world war, only a handful of countries were able to grow to a fully industrialised level of development.

Over the past three decades China’s growth has been a variation of the east Asian growth model with initial conditions of a planned socialist economy. That growth pattern has now almost exhausted its potential. China has reached a crucial juncture: without painful structural adjustments, the momentum of its growth could suddenly be lost.

China’s growth is highly imbalanced in many aspects of its economy. In this essay, I will confine my discussion to one of the most striking imbalances in China: the so-called “twin surpluses”, namely, the current account and capital account surpluses. China has run a current account surplus persistently (Figure 1, p 87) for 20 years (except for 1993). In 2008, the current account surplus ballooned to $426.1 billion, accounting for 9.6% of gross domestic product (GDP).

Running a current account surplus persistently for decades is nothing new and is not necessarily abnormal. For example, the United States (US) started to run a trade surplus from 1874; which lasted almost uninterruptedly until the late 1970s. Since the middle of the 1970s Japan has run a trade and current account surplus for four decades, and there is still no end in sight. The same is true of Germany.

According to the economics of development, a country will experience different stages of development with different gaps in saving-investment and hence different patterns of external balances in different periods of time. The different patterns of external balances are the result of cross-border inter-temporal maximisa

are the result of cross-border inter-temporal maximisa-are the result of cross-border inter-temporal maximisa-

the result of cross-border inter-temporal maximisation of utility functions of different countries. A developing country would usually first experience a period of current account as well as trade account deficits, then a period of a trade account surplus and current account deficit, and, finally, a period of both trade and current account surpluses. Only by running current account defi

. Only by running current account deficits can developing countries run capital account surpluses, so as to utilise foreign capital inflows from developed countries to cover

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0 50 150 250 350 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 Current account Capital account

Sources: State Administration of Foreign Exchanges, the People’s Bank of China.

the shortage of domestic capital. W

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plus and at the same time become a capital exporting country.

Generally speaking, because countries in the world are at different stages of development with different income levels and age structures, with some countries running current account deficits and others generating surpluses. If the desired surpluses and deficits of different countries cancel out each other, “global imbalances” in principle should not be an issue.

Perverse Imbalances

However, the current global imbalances are perverse. On the one hand, the richest country in the world – the US – has been persistently running a current account deficit over 30 years. On the other, the much poorer emerging economies as a whole have run current account surpluses since the Asian financial crisis. This pattern of international balance of payments represents a serious misallocation of resources on a massive scale. A correction should and will happen sooner or later, and hence the current global imbalances are not sustainable.

The imbalances that have stuck in China are even more perverse, because while it persistently runs a large current account surplus, it also runs a large capital account surplus. As can be seen in Figure 1, until 2005 China’s capital account surplus was larger than its current account surplus. As a result of the so-called “twin surpluses”, China now has accumulated more than $3.1 trillion foreign exchange reserves, the bulk of which is in the form of US Treasury bills.

Is anything wrong with China’s twin surpluses? In my view, there are at least four problems. I call them the Dornbusch problem, Williamson problem, Krugman problem and Rogoff problem. The late Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Rudi Dornbusch pointed out in the 1970s that running a current account surplus means exporting capital. It is irrational for a developing country to lend money to rich countries, because domestic resources should be used for domestic investment, which will bring in higher returns and an improvement in the living standards of the people? China as one of the poorest countries in the world, in terms of per capita GDP, lending money for decades to the richest country in the world – the US – is surely irrational.

John Williamson pointed out in his speech in the Reserve Bank of India in 1995 that capital inflows should be translated into a

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current account deficit. Running twin surpluses implies that China fails to buy foreign capital goods and technology with borrowed money. Instead, on aggregate terms, it “lends” the money back to the original creditors at a very low return.

The Krugman problem refers to the fact that because of the devaluation of the dollar in terms of the dollar index, China’s foreign exchange reserves are facing serious capital losses.

Finally, according to Ken Rogoff, due to the ballooning budget deficit, the temptation for the US government to inflate away its debt burden may become irresistible. As a result, the purchasing power of China’s packed saving in the form of US government securities may evaporate quickly. In 2003, China’s foreign exchange reserves totalled just above $400 billion. Now it stands at $3.2 trillion, an 800% increase. However, in 2003, the price of crude oil was generally under $30 a barrel, and the price of gold was less than $400 an ounce. Now (July 2011) prices for crude oil and gold are more than $120 a barrel and $1,600 an ounce, respectively. In fact, from 1929 to 2009

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ing power. It will devalue even further in the future. At this moment, a more frightening probability is looming large US government securities might default! If that happens, China will be devastated.

‘Dollar Trap’

It is crystal clear that to run twin surpluses and continue to accumulate foreign exchange reserves is not in China’s interests. China has taken actions to correct its external imbalances, but the progress is painfully slow and the economy is sinking even deeper into tt

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l account and total balance of payments surpluses were still as high as $180 billion, $100 billion and $475 billion, respectively. The bulk of the balance of payments surplus has again been inverted in US government securities.

Current Account Surplus

Why has China been doing something that seems to be not in its own interest for so long? The most commonly used analytical framework for analysing China’s current account surplus is based on the identity S-I=X-M where S, I, X and M represent savings, investments, exports and imports, respectively.1 In other words, the above identity says that excess saving is equal to the current account surplus. Basically, there are two strands of thinking about the causes of China’s current account surplus. For one school, the cause of China’s current account surplus is the positive saving-investment gap. This school of thought can be labelled as the “structural school”. For another school, the cause of the surplus should be found in China’s policies aimed at promoting a trade surplus over the decades. This school of thought can be labelled as the “policy school”. It is worth mentioning that S-I=X-M is just an identity which says nothing about causality.

Causality based on this identity can be identified only by empirical analysis. The structural school identifies China’s high saving rate as the most important cause of the country’s current

SPECIAL ARTICLE

account surplus. In turn, the most commonly attributed causes of China’s high saving include:2

  • The absence of a social safety net; as a result people have to save for retirement, medical care and their children’s education.
  • High enterprise saving,3 which, in turn, is attributable to a high share of industry in the economy and hence a large share of interest and profits, instead of wages, in national income.
  • Low dividend payments. In state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the State, the largest shareholder, until recently received no dividend at all from most SOEs.
  • Increase in profitability since the mid-1990s due to rapid industrial growth and restructuring of SOEs.4
  • A favourable age structure: low dependence ratio and high working-age-to-population ratio in the past two decades.
  • The widening income gap: the share of the rich, who have a higher saving propensity in GDP, increases significantly.
  • However, according to some other economists, “China’s saving is high but not exceptional. As a share of GDP, China’s corporate saving at best rivals Japan’s, its household saving is below India’s, and its government saving is less than Korea’s.”5 Hence, attempts to identify any one single explanation for China’s exceptionally high aggregate saving rate will almost surely be less than convincing.

    While not denying the merits of the arguments presented by the structural school, as a person who has been involved in the debate on China’s imbalances since 1996, I tend to emphasise the importance of the contributions of policy factors to China’s trade and current account surpluses. It is not an exaggeration to say that since the beginning of the opening up in the late 1970s and early 1980s and until recent years, China’s export, foreign direct investment (FDI) and exchange rate policies were mainly, if not exclusively, aimed at achieving a current account surplus and accumulating foreign exchange reserves. Correspondingly, saving and investment have to be adjusted one way or another, so that a current account surplus can be achieved. It also can be said that to a certain extent, both the positive savinginvestment gap and the current account surplus are consequences of these policies.

    It is worth mentioning that when Chinese economists were debating bitterly in the late 1990s on whether China should continue to pursue a policy of achieving a current account surplus while attracting large capital inflows, no one asked if at all there was a positive saving-investment gap in China.

    Why was China so keen on promoting exports and accumulating foreign exchange reserves until the middle of the 2000s?6 There are four main explanations:

  • Shortage of foreign exchange reserves in the 1980s.
  • Need for self-insurance in the 1990s.
  • For parking the excess saving abroad (a structural cause) mainly in the 2000s.
  • Crowding out by foreign direct investment.
  • For promoting growth (a cyclical factor).
  • China’s main export promotion policies, some of which have been abandoned in the 2000s, have included:
  • Self-balancing of foreign exchange and local content requirements for important foreign investment projects: This
  • policy was scrapped after China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation.

    • Undervaluation of the exchange rate: Before the Asian fi

    the exchange rate: Before the Asian fi

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    exchange rate: Before the Asian financial crisis, China’s exchange rate policy was characterised by the “real targeting approach”. The exchange rate was set according to the production costs of exports with the aim of maintaining the competitiveness of its exports. During the Asian financial crisis, the reminbi (RMB) was pegged to the dollar. The peg was dropped in 2005. However, the pace of appreciation has been slow.

  • Tax rebate: This is a very important policy instrument. When the tax rebate rates are correctly calculated, they do not constitute subsidies. However, in practice, the policy provides undue incentives for enterprises to produce for external markets and enables uncompetitive exporting enterprises to survive,
  • Comprehensive favourable treatment given to export-oriented enterprises within economic development zones.
  • It is self-evident that if China’s current account surplus is a natural result of excess saving, why has China bothered to design and implement so many export promotion policies over the decades? Needless to say, to reduce China’s current account surplus, the country therefore needs to adjust its export promotion policies.

    Capital Account Surplus

    Now, let us turn to China’s capital account surplus. China is a high saving country, and since the 1990s there has been no shortage of foreign exchange in China. Why does China still wish to attract some $50 billion of foreign capital a year? In my view, a country like Japan or Germany can run a current account surplus and capital account deficit. Alternatively, a country can run a current account deficit and capital account surplus, like most east Asian countries did before the Asian financial crisis. Only under special conditions can countries run both current account and capital account surpluses to build up foreign exchange reserves. The sudden appearance of twin surpluses in the east Asian countries in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis is a case in point. To run twin surpluses persistently for two decades is an abnormality.

    It is worth mentioning that when China was just opening up in the early 1980s, a debt crisis struck the Latin American countries. Based on the Latin American experience, the Chinese government

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    imposed tight control over foreign borrowing from the beginning. On the other hand, FDI was regarded as the safest form of foreign capital and hence an extremely preferential policy towards FDI was put in place. China’s success in attracting FDI is the envy of its fellow developing countries. There is nothing wrong with attracting FDI, the question is why has China taken in so much FDI over the past three decades, while it has been running a current account surplus (meaning when it has not suffered from a shortage of saving and foreign exchange reserves)? The answers can be summarised as follows:

    First, due to the under-development of the financial markets, though funds are available it is difficult for many enterprises to raise funds domestically. In contrast, due to the preferential policy towards FDI, to attract this source of finance is much easier. As a result, some enterprises attract FDI first and then sell their foreign exchanges obtained via FDI to the central bank, and use RMB thus obtained to buy capital goods produced locally. Even if funds can be mobilised at home

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    cult for potential importers to convert the RMB funds into foreign exchange so that foreign goods can be brought. Hence to attract FDI is still a better option. The fact that Chinese firms need to use foreign capital markets as an intermediate to obtain domestic resources for domestic investment shows that the fragmentation of and friction in China’s financial markets is an important cause for the large FDI inflows.

    Second, in China’s efforts to introduce FDI, local governments have played a key role and their excessive intervention is a major cause for the massive FDI inflows. Local government officials have a very strong incentive to attract FDI, because the amount of foreign funds they are able to attract is one of the most important, if not the single most important, performance measurements in their work (Zheng Ji). It is a common practice in China that all chief officials at all levels of governments are assigned targets for attracting FDI. Those who attract the largest amount of FDI are the most likely candidates for further promotion.

    Despite the fact that the returns required by foreign investors are high, FDI, from the myopic point of view of officials of local governments, is a “free lunch”. The important thing for them is that in the initial stages they do not need to pay hard currency and bear investment risks. They do not

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    about paing large dividends in five to 10 years’ time, if the investment proves successful. What they need to do is to commit to pay dividends to foreign investors in the future, which anyway will not be their responsibility. Yes, local governments are responsible for creating a favourable environment for foreign investment, such as acquiring lands that are state-or community-owned, building roads, laying water-supply pipes, erecting a power grid and so on. Chinese officials are competent and effective in achieving these objectives and the costs of achieving these objectives are affordable for them. Furthermore, China’s fiscal system and institutional arrangements, characterised by valueadded tax and a sort of fiscal federalism, a so g ve lo

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    ments a great incentive to attract FDI. This form of finance has become indispensable for increasing tax revenues at local levels. From the point of view of foreign investors, on top of political and macroeconomic stability, the temptation of the availability cheap

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    but skilled workers,

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    ection, free infrastructure and low or negative rents on land uses are all just too hard to resist.
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    ments in attracting FDI and of foreign investors in investing perfectly coincide.

    Third, in recent years, in order to give new impetus to the reform of the SOEs and commercial banks, the merger and acquisition of Chinese firms by foreign investors and the acquisition of shares by “international strategic investors” in China’s commercial banks have been encouraged. Consequently, capital flows in and adds to the existing stock of foreign exchange reserves, even though domestic capital markets have more than enough funds for them to raise. In 2005 alone, $32 billion of capital was attracted to China as a result of the sale of bank shares to international strategic investors, although China already had more than $800 billion of foreign exchange reserves, without knowing how to invest them for a higher return. In 2010, some Chinese commercial banks successively launched initial public offering (IPO) abroad. As a result, billions of dollars flowed into China, though the banks did not need foreign exchange. As soon as they obtained the dollars, they sold the bulk of them to the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) for RMBs and the PBOC had to use the dollars to buy US government securities.

    Fourth, the single biggest provider of FDI is Hong Kong and the second largest is Virgin Islands. The latter alone accounted for more than 19% of China’s total inflows of FDI in 2005. Though difficult to verify, anecdotal evidences suggest that a very large proportion of China’s FDI is rent-seeking-roundtripping capital.

    Having explained why China has attracted so much FDI, though it is a country with excess saving, a related but different question we need to ask here is why China fails to translate capital inflows (in the form of FDI) into a current account deficit. This is because: (i) FDI in China is export-oriented, and (ii) FDI has crowded out domestic investment.

    Export Orientation of FDI

    As mentioned earlier, as a result of the Chinese government’s policy incentives, foreign funded enterprises in the country are mostly an export-oriented. China’s implementation of an exportpromotion policy coincided with the formation of international production networks (IPNs), and its trade pattern was shaped to a large extent by FDI that flowed in as a vehicle for the formation of IPNs. The pattern of FDI inflows into China was, in turn, facilitated by the Chinese government’s policy favouring processing trade, which was motivated by the Chinese government’s fear of a current account deficit and its desire to allow the country’s comparative advantage in labour-intensive products to have full play.

    As a result, China’s trade is dominated by Foreign Funded Enterprises (FFEs), which account for 50-60% of China’s total trade and more than 50-70% of China’s exports, since 2000. The domination of processing trade in China’s trade, which accounts more than 50% of China’s total trade even before the onset of the Asian financial crisis, means that China must run a current account surplus. It is worth noting that since 2005, while China

    SPECIAL ARTICLE

    SS’i i

    A B SS’I

    Vertical axis r represents investment return and horizontal axis I represents the amount of investment. Each rectangle bar represents one investment project with the width of the bar representing the scale of the investment project. Vertical line SS represents saving which is assumed given and will not be subject to the influence of the interest rate. SS’ is China’s investment in US government securities.

    has run a trade surplus, its trade other than in processing has been in deficit in almost all years.

    Crowding Out by FDI

    China’s persistent current account surplus can also be explained by the crowding out effect of FDI. Recent studies7 have found that due to China’s highly concessional policy towards FDI, foreign capital has crowded out a lpr

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    ment. As a result, Chinese capital has to settle for the second best, namely, to invest in US government securities. In recent years, great efforts have been made to promote outbound FDI. Hopeful, outbound FDI will be able to replace investment in US Treasury securities and other financial assets, to become the main outlet for China’s excess saving and reduce its needs for accumulating more foreign exchange reserves.

    The reason why the FDI crowding out effect contributes to China’s current account surplus can be explained by Figure 2.

    Basically, Figure 2 says that because China’s FDI policy is already extremely generous at the national level, and, owing to market as well as wider institutional distortions, many local governments will go even further to attract FDI regardless of costs, FFEs are able to capture a great proportion of the more profitable projects (AB), China’s resources available for investment, which is AS, cannot be fully utilised within China. Assuming that without FDI, China’s saving-investment gap would be zero: saving=investment=AS. Now, as a result of FDI crowding out domestic investment, a positive saving-investment gap appears, which is equal to AS-BS=AB. The excess resources represented by AB have to be translated into a current account surplus, and this surplus in turn has to be invested in US government securities AB=SS’. According to the US Conference Board, in 2008 US firms’ average investment return in China is 33%, and in the same year, according to the World Bank, multinationals’ investment return in China was 22%. In contrast, China’s investment return on US government securities is less

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    august 27, 2011 vol xlvi no 35

    EPW
    Economic Political Weekly

    SPECIAL ARTICLE

    than 3%. The crowing out effect is serious indeed. It is worth mentioning that there is no denying that the reason why FDI can capture a large proportion of domestic firms’ investment opportunity is because many FFEs are more efficient and have better technology.

    To summarise on the causes of China’s twin surpluses, let us return to S-I=X-M. Now we can see that it is difficult to say whether the left-hand side of equation decides the position of the right-hand side or it is the other way around. In fact, in the early stages of development, China’s export promotion policy was the dominant contributing factor to its current account surplus in the 1980s and 1990s. It can be said that excess saving during this period of time was mainly a result of China’s current account surplus. Either savings have to be increased or investment has to be cut, so resources can be used for running a current account surplus and accumulating foreign exchange reserves. However, during the 2000s, as a result of the establishment of the domination of FFEs in the export sector and China’s position in the IPNs, the trade surplus has become more and more structural. The consolidation of the domination of processing trade in China’s trade coincides with the changes such as an increase in precautionary savings, which work on the left-hand sided of the identity S-I=X-M.

    As a result, China’s current account surplus looks increasingly like a structural problem. This means that even if the government abandons its trade promotion policy and the RMB is allowed to appreciate significantly, it is still possible that China will continue to run a current account surplus for a certain period of time. However, this does not mean that a change in policy is useless. On the contrary, in order to correct the export-biased economic structure, many policies, including the exchange rate policy, should be adjusted and changed. Of course, efforts should also be made to reduce the positive S-I gap, so that the pressure to run a current account surplus can be reduced. In short, in order to correct imbalances, a comprehensive policy package should be implemented.

    Correcting Imbalances

    The Chinese government has tried to correct imbalances by simulating domestic demand, allowing the yuan to appreciate gradually, diversifying foreign exchange reserves away from US Treasury bills, creating soverign wealth funds, participating in regional financial cooperation, and promoting the reform of the international monetary system and internationalisation of the yuan. However, all these efforts, though useful and necessary, have failed to address the direct cause of the rapid increase in foreign exchange reserves. Due to the continuous worsening of the US fiscal position, the possibility of an atempt by the US government to inflate away its debt burden, as pointed out by Rogoff, is increasingly likely. One unfortunate thing is that losses in financial assets will not be realised until the holders have decided to cash out. If the US government continues to pay principal and interest on its public debt, and China continues to park its savings in US government securities, the game may continue for a very long time indeed. However, this situation is ultimately unsustainable. The longer the delay in the adjustment, the more violent and destructive the adjustment will be.

    Stopping a further accumulation of foreign exchange reserves is becoming a more urgent issue than rebalancing China’s current account. However, to stop the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and thus minimise China’s welfare and capital losses, the simplest solution would be for the PBOC to end intervention. But this implies that China must allow the yuan to float freely and thus to appreciate.

    Ending central bank intervention in the currency markets is a complex issue. The devil is in the details. But, the economic and welfare costs of China’s slow pace of adjusting the exchange rate are very high and will increase by the day. It is time for China to consider allowing the yuan to float freely, while reserving the right to intervene when it must, and tighten the management of cross-border capital flows (permissible under last November’s G-20 agreements).

    Some in China are still very reluctant to reduce China’s current account surplus and allow the RMB to appreciate. One of the reasons for the reluctance is America’s China bashing. For those reluctant Chinese, I would like to recommend that they read a 2005 op-ed written Phillip L Swagel of the American Enterprise Institute, formerly chief of staff of economic advisory council to the US president and assistant secretary of the US Treasury. In the op-ed, he asked,

    why pressure China to revalue? US policymakers surely understand the downsides of a yuan revaluation for the US economy. And they certainly must realise that their very public campaign only makes it more difficult for the Chinese to take action. Could it be that this is the point? A cynic might hope that the push for a Chinese exchange rate change is not a response to misguided political pressures, but is instead a devious attempt to prolong the enormous benefits the US derives at China’s expense from the fixed dollar-yuan exchange rate. Or perhaps this is accident, not design. Either way, the administration has come up with a brilliant strategy to keep the good times rolling.8

    Whatever the Americans say or not say, China must speed up its rebalancing so as to guarantee the sustainability of its economic growth.

    Notes

    1 To simplify the analysis, here, I use the concepts trade balance and current account balance interchangeably.

    2 According to a World Bank study, saving is driven by higher output growth, fiscal consolidation, increases in private sector credit, favourable changes in age structure, and improvement in terms of trade. It is worth mentioning that to explain high saving is not equivalent to explain the current account surplus. Hence, there is a methodological problem with the structural school.

    3 Corporate saving increase is a global phenomenon. saving has increased. Now household saving has
    In Asia, saving reached a record high level in 2004, become the largest contributor to total saving.
    a substantial part of the saving comes from public saving. Marco Terrones and Roberto Cardarelli: 5 Ma Guonan and Wang Yi, “China's High Saving Rate: Myth and Reality”, BIS Working Papers
    “Global Saving and Investment: The Current No 312, June 2010.
    State of Play”, World Economic Outlook, 1 September 2005, p 93, World Bank. 6 There is abundant literature arguing for further accumulation of foreign exchange reserves in
    4 Bert Hofman and Louis Kuijs, “A Note on Saving, China.
    Investment, and Profits of China’s Enterprises”, 7 Lu Feng and Yu Yongding, “China’s Imbalances: A
    World Bank Office Beijing. A version of this note was published in the Far Eastern Economic Review of Microeconomic Perspective”, Social Sciences of China, forthcoming, 2011.
    October 2006. Since 2006, the share of enterprises 8 Phillip L Swagel, “Yuan Answers?” On the Issues,
    in total saving has fallen, while that of household American Enterprise Institute, June 2005 online.

    EPW
    august 27, 2011 vol xlvi no 35

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