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Land Acquisition Law and the Proposed Changes

An analysis of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and its interpretation by the courts shows that the holder or tenant of the land has suffered in major ways. It gives the government complete power to acquire land for any "public purpose" while the courts have virtually adopted a handsoff attitude and allowed all kinds of land acquisitions for private companies. The proposed Land Acquisition Amendment Bill makes it much easier for the government to acquire land for any private company, is nonparticipatory in nature and has escape clauses as far as giving jobs to the displaced or the provision of "land for land" is concerned. The rehabilitation and resettlement bills which are also on the anvil may provide solace to the displaced but history has shown that such schemes do not work.

Land Acquisition Law and the Proposed Changes

Mihir Desai

(t)he concept of ‘eminent domain’ is an essential” attribute of every State. This concept is based on the fundamental principle that the interest and claim of the whole community is always superior to the interest of an individual.2

The power of eminent domain has three

An analysis of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and its interpretation by the courts shows that the holder or tenant of the land has suffered in major ways. It gives the government complete power to acquire land for any “public purpose” while the courts have virtually adopted a handsoff attitude and allowed all kinds of land acquisitions for private companies. The proposed Land Acquisition Amendment Bill makes it much easier for the government to acquire land for any private company, is nonparticipatory in nature and has escape clauses as far as giving jobs to the displaced or the provision of “land for land” is concerned. The rehabilitation and resettlement bills which are also on the anvil may provide solace to the displaced but history has shown that such schemes do not work.

Mihir Desai ( is a Mumbai-based lawyer working on human rights issues.

ncreasingly over the last few years there is a clamour for repealing or at least amending the land acquisition law in India.

The government has announced that in the monsoon session of Parliament a bill making major amendments to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the rehabilitation and resettlement bills will be introduced. The declared objective is that these laws will ensure fairness in acquisition coupled with complete and total rehabilitation of the affected persons.

This article focuses on the legal aspects concerning the Land Acquisition Act, the myriad problems caused by this law and the sweep and implications of the amendments which the government has promised to introduce.

Land Acquisition Act, 1894

The main philosophy behind this Act is what is known as the power of the State of eminent domain. The State may directly own lands through acquisition, purchase, etc, or by default. That means all lands which are not privately owned are owned by the State. But even in respect of privately owned lands the State has the power of eminent domain.1 Academicians, researcher s and even judges have regularly cited the following paragraph from Hugo Grotius in De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625) as one of the earliest instances when this concept was used:

The property of subject is under the eminent domain of the state, so that the state or he who acts for it may use and even alienate and destroy such property, not only in cases of extreme necessity, …but for ends of public utility, to which ends those who found civil society must be supposed to have intended that private ends should give way. But it is to be added that when this is done the state is bound to make good the loss to those who lose their property.

The Supreme Court observed, essential ingredients: First, the power of the State to take over private land; second, this power has to be exercised for public good; and third, the obligation of the state to compensate those whose lands are so taken over. Essentially it deals with power of the State to expropriate lands from those who are not willing sellers.

The second aspect of the philosophy behind the Act is that it is constructed around an individual whose land is acquired. But more and more we are witnessing entire villages and communities being uprooted due to acquisition. The loss is not just of a piece of land but of community ties, the commons, cultural roots, and much more. The Act does not take this into account at all. The third aspect is that compensation is payable only to the owner of the land or a legally recognised tenant. Everybody else who is dependent on the land – tiller, landless labourer, etc – are to be ignored. In a country where the overwhelming majority of the lands are in the name of a male, the women are also totally ignored. The impact is even more when mass displacements take place as artisans, fisherfolk and others also lose out due to acquisition and their rights are ignored.

The fourth aspect of the underlying philosophy is that money can compensate for all losses and once people are paid adequate compensation they can go on to have a wonderful life. The presumption is that every person is familiar with the money market and the banking system and will invest so as to get the best longterm returns. This totally ignores the histories of people, the choice which they ought to have in a democracy, the vagaries of the market, and the attachment which individuals have to their land and to their community.

The fifth aspect of this philosophy is that there is only one way of development and that is to industrialise and industria lise even more and that this

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will benefit everybody. An adjunct of this is that with massive industrialisation a large number of jobs will be created which will absorb those who have lost their lands, a completel y unsubstantiated and false presumption.

The Land Acquisition Act

The broad object of the Act is to expropriate private lands. Under Section 4, if the State is satisfied that land in a given locality is required for public purpose a notification in the gazette will be issued and a public notice to this effect will be put up in the locality. After this the survey of the land can be carried out. The acquisition proceedings can be done either by the central government or the state government depending on who needs the land.

Under Section 5A any person with a claim in the compensation for the land to be acquired can raise an objection in writing with the collector within 30 days who will in turn give a personal hearing and refer the matter to the appropriate government with his recommendations for its decision. Thus, artisans, landless labourers, tillers without a title, fisherfolk, etc, cannot raise objections.

The next step is the Section 6 Declaration which has to be issued by the government after taking into account the objections. This notification is required to set out the details of the area to be acquired and the public purpose for which it is to be acquired. It also states that the declaration will be treated as conclusive evidence that the property is needed for a public purpose and after this the government can proceed to acquire the land.

After this, a public notice is given under Section 9 asking that claims of compensation be made to the collector before a notified day. The next step is the enquiry and award by the collector who will decid e the value of the land (on the date of Sectio n 4 notification), the exact area to be acquired, the compensation to be paid and the apportionmen t of the compensation amongst various claimants. Payment of the compensation has to be made at the time the collector makes his award under Section 11.

In determining the amount of compensation the collector (or the court as the case may be) would be guided by provisions of Sections 23 and 24. Section 23 provides that the authority (court or the collector) shall take into account the market value of the property on the date of the Section 4 notification, any damage to standing crops and trees at the time of taking possession of the property by the collector and other sundry amounts. The section also provides for an additional payment of 15% of the market value in view of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. This is in fact the solatium payable for the coercive aspect of the deal.

Section 24 provides for matters which have to be neglected for fixing the compensation. Most important, it says that any increase in the value of the land acquired owing to the use to which it is likely to be put is to be ignored.

Section 17 is the urgency clause which permits the collector to take possession of land in the event of an urgency within 15 days of the Section 9 notice. This is another highly misused clause.

If any of the persons interested in the land is dissatisfied with the collector’s award she can ask the collector to make a reference to the court on issues of compensation and measurement of the land. No reference is permitted in respect of whether or not the land is to be actually used for public purpose or whether or not the purpos e for which the land is acquired is actually a public purpose. After hearing the parties the Court would pass the order.

Part VII deals with acquisition of land for companies. No land can be acquired for a company unless there is a prior consent of the appropriate government and unless there is an agreement in writing between the company and the government. Such acquisition can only be for the following objectives:

  • (a) Construction of dwelling houses for the workmen of the company.
  • (b) The acquisition is needed for the construction of some work and the work is will be useful to the public. Only if the government is satisfied about this can such acquisition be carried out. Besides, the costs of acquisition have to be borne by the company. However, this chapter will not apply in cases where the government is obliged to provide land to any company under any agreement.
  • In short, therefore, the Land Acquisition Act provides for the substance and procedure for expropriating land from private landholders for public purpose including for private corporations by providing compensation to persons interested in the land.

    The Controversies

    The main legal controversies are the following :

  • (a) What constitutes public purpose for which the lands are to be acquired and who determines this?
  • (b) Is the government obliged to take into account the kinds of lands it can acquire – for instance agricultural as against fallow lands, etc?
  • (c) Who is entitled to compensation under the act? Only the landowners or those dependent on land such as landless labourers, artisans, etc?
  • (d) What is meant by compensation? Does it include only monetary compensation and if so how much?
  • Public Purpose

    Under the Land Acquisition Act land can only be acquired for a “public purpose”. The issues that are becoming increasingly significant are what is the meaning of “public purpose” and whether land can be acquired by the government for private corporations. Section 2(f) defines public purpose.3 As is clear from the definition acquisition of land for companies cannot be construed as being for a public purpose. Land can be acquired for corporations under Chapter VII but only to provide housing for their workers or for construction that is likely to prove useful to the public. Even then, Chapter VII lays down additional and slightly more stringent procedural requirements for acquiring lands for companies.

    The courts ought to have given a simpl e answer. If land is being acquired for a company it should be done under Chapter VII and only if both the procedural and substantive conditionalities provided in that chapter are met. Otherwise the company would be free to privately negotiate with private landowners and buy the land if landowners are willing and if it is otherwise permissible (for instance, under the Land Ceiling Acts, Agricultral Lands Acts and if permitted under the laws providing for restrictions on transfer of lands belonging to scheduled tribes (STs)). The courts have however allowed

    june 25, 2011 vol xlvi nos 26 & 27


    all kinds of land acquisitions for private companies as we will note below. This has been done both by a liberal meaning attributed to the term “public purpose” and also by whittling down the requirements of Chapter VII.

    The definition of “public purpose” under the act is totally vague and the section is much litigated. But the Supreme Court has consistently held that whether a public purpose will be met by a given acquisition is entirely for the State to decide and that the courts are not competent to go into the issue of whether a particular purpose is a public purpose or not unless colourable exercise of power is proved – which becomes a virtual impossibility. Secondly, the courts have also held that if a land is acquired for a particular public purpose and is subsequently used for another public purpose there is nothing wrong with it. The Supreme Court observed,

    Once the original acquisition is valid and title has vested in the municipality, how it uses the excess land is no concern of the original owner and cannot be the basis for invalidating the acquisition.4

    Thirdly, the courts have held that even if a portion of the land is not put to public use but becomes surplus for the use it cannot revert back to the owner because the land has already been vested in the government. Fourth, while the landowner can challenge the acquisition order such a challenge can only be on the limited ground of quantum of compensation or its apportionment and not on the issue of public purpose unless of course mala fides are proved.

    For instance, whether in a given area an airport or a power company is needed or not is not an aspect the courts will go into nor will they look at how much land is require d for a project or whether an alternate or better site can be selected for the project or barren lands can be acquired instead of fertile lands. Primarily, the courts will only look into procedural fairnes s and mala fides or that of adequacy of compensation.

    In Bajirao Kote’s case5 the Supreme Court observed

    It is primarily for the state government to decide whether there exists public purpose or not, and it is not for the Supreme Court or the high courts to evaluate the evidence and come to its own conclusion whether or not there is public purpose.

    In this case the issue was whether acquiring land for the purpose of building an access path for a Saibaba temple was a public purpose or not. The Court held that if the government says it is public purpose it has to be treated as such.

    This becomes all the more important because the Land Acquisition Act does not require any public hearings or reasoned orders on issues of public purpose or selection of lands for acquisition. On the one hand, complete undemocratic power to acquire any land for any public purpose is given to the government and on the other, the courts have virtually adopted a handsoff attitude.

    From the beginning it has been held by the courts that “public purpose” involves an element of general interest of the community and whatever furthers the general interest must be regarded as a public purpose.6

    Loose Interpretations

    Over the years this term has been loosely interpreted to grotesque proportions. Acquisitions made for the Yamuna Expressway were challenged. The two most important grounds were that apart from acquiring lands for the expressway itself, there were other lands being acquired for amusement parks, etc, which could not be held to be acquired for a public purpose. The second ground was that the land was being acquired and handed over to a private developer. Dealing with the first aspect the Supreme Court observed,

    The concept of public purpose has to be held to be wider than ‘public necessity’. Merely because the benefit goes to a particular section of society the acquisition cease to be for a public purpose.7

    For repelling the second ground a wonderful argument was used. The project was to be handed over to a private developer who would exploit it for 36 years and then hand it back to the government. The Court held that since the lands were not vested in the developer who had to hand it back after 36 years it could not be said to be acquired for a private person.

    The courts have held that public purpose does not mean either public necessity or public use. Even if the acquired land is put to the use of a fraction of the public it is still public purpose and that too independent of which strata of society will use it. Similarly handing over the acquired land to a private company which manufacture d nothing of use to the public at large was still held to be a public purpose because the manufactured items were to be exported and some foreign exchange gains would accrue from it. Over the years, the courts have held that acquiring lands and handing them over to a private company even for projects such as setting up a paper mill8 or for electric compressors or for setting up a factory manufacturing compressors9 is a public purpose. The courts have now virtually held that as long as some manufacturing, service or business activity is carried out on the acquired property it will be held to be acquired for public purpose because some employment is being generated.

    Recently, in two judgments the Supreme Court has applied a pro poor interpretation to the “public purpose” phrase. In Dev Sharan vs State of Uttar Pradesh10 agricultural lands were acquired for construction of a district jail at village Murchha. The acquisition was made under the urgency clause. This was set aside by the Court holding that there was no great urgency as the State itself had taken a long time to implement its decision. The Court observed:

    Admittedly the Land Acquisition Act, a preconstitutional legislation of colonial vintage is a drastic law, being expropriatory in nature as it confers on the state a power which affects persons property right. Even though right of property is no longer fundamental and was never a natural right, and is acquired on a concession by the State, it has to be accepted that without right to some property other rights become illusory. This court is considering these questions, especially in the context of some recent trends in land acquisition. This court is of the opinion that the concept of public purpose in land acquisition has to be viewed from an angle which is consistent with the concept of welfare state…It must be accepted that in construing ‘public purpose’, a broad and overall view has to be taken and the focus must be on ensuring maximum benefit to the largest number of people. Any attempt by the State to acquire land by promoting a public purpose to benefit a particular group of people or to serve any particular interest at the cost of the interest of a large section of the people, especially of the common people, defeats the very concept of public purpose.

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    Similarly in the Banda Development Authority vs Motilal Agarwal (decided on 26 April)11 the Supreme Court was dealing with acquisition of agricultural lands in Banda, UP for residential purposes, again under the urgency clause. The observations of the Court need extensive reproduction:

    The resultant effect of these acquisitions is that the landowners, who were doing agricultural operations and other ancillary activities in rural areas, have been deprived of the only source of their livelihood. Majority of them do not have any idea about their constitutional and legal rights, which can be enforced by availing the constitutional remedies under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. They reconcile with deprivation of land by accepting the amount of compensation offered by the government and by thinking that it is their fate and destiny determined by god. Even those who get semblance of education are neither conversant with the functioning of the State apparatus nor they can access the records prepared by the concerned authorities as a prelude to the acquisition of land by invoking Section 4 with or without the aid of Section 17(1) and/ or 17(4). Therefore, while examining the landowner’s challenge to the acquisition of land in a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, the high court should not adopt a pedantic approach, as has been done in the present case, and decide the matter keeping in view the constitutional goals of social and economic justice and the fact that even though the right to property is no longer a fundamental right, the same continues to be an important constitutional right and in terms of Article 300-A, no person can be deprived of his property except by authority of law. In cases where the acquisition is made by invoking Section 4 read with Section 17(1) and/or 17(4), the high court should insist upon filing of reply affidavit by the respondents and production of the relevant records and carefully scrutinise the same before pronouncing upon legality of the impugned notification/action because a negative result without examining the relevant records to find out whether the competent authority had formed a bona fide opinion.

    The Court also observed:

    Though, in exercise of the power of eminent domain, the government can acquire the private property for public purpose, it must be remembered that compulsory taking of one’s property is a serious matter. If the property belongs to economically disadvantaged segment of the society or people suffering from other handicaps, then the Court is not only entitled but is duty bound to scrutinise the action/decision of the State with greater vigilance, care and circumspection keeping in view the fact that the landowner is likely to become landles s and deprived of the only source of his livelihood and/or shelter.

    Though these are seminal observations it needs to be kept in mind that both the above decisions are given by the same twojudge bench of the Supreme Court and the manner in which the Supreme Court is structured it is possible that these remarks can be ignored or not by a different interpretation. Nonetheless if these remarks do indicate a trend then it is a very good trend. But broadly speaking, as Usha Ramanathan has rightly observed12:

    This has meant that competing versions of what constitutes public purpose, the probability of impoverishment, the dislodging of livelihoods, the breakdown of cultural contiguities and continuities have, for instance, not been relevant elements in judicial challenge to the meaning of public purpose. Even where land is acquired on the pretext of furthering a stated public purpose, but it is not so used, or it is diverted to a different use, the immunity from successful challenge extends. This has contributed to the “absolute” nature of the power of the state to take over, divest and divert land.

    If acquisition for companies is done under Chapter VII it can be for a limited objective. It was therefore important for the corporates and the State to bring in such acquisition under the provisions concerning the general acquisition measures. The courts have held that if the compensation amount is wholly paid by the company concerned it will have to be treated as acquisition for the compnay requirin g it to meet the stringent conditions of Chapter VII. However if the compensation is even partly paid for by the government it will be treated as acquisition for public purpose and not for a particular company. This has been taken to absurd proportions. Even if the State contributed Rs 100 or even Re 1 towards compensation payment (and the balance was paid by the company) it has been held to be acquisition for public purpose and not for a company.13


    The other controversy concerning land acquisition laws revolves around the issue of compensation. To begin with, the Act speaks only about compensation and it is assumed that monetary compensation will suffice. No rehabilitation. No land for land. No jobs. No shares. This is one of the major controversies concerning the law. I will go into this issue a little later.

    But even assuming that only money is to be given in exchange for expropriation the question arises as to who should this money be paid to and how much?

    To begin with, only those persons are entitled to compensation who have an “interest in the land”. This has been held by the courts to include “lawful owners” and “lawful tenants”. Landless labourers who may have worked on the lands for decades are not to be given any compensation. If a substantial part of a village is acquired, the artisans on whom the landowners or tenants may be dependant do not have to be provided any compensation. If common village grazing land is taken over, no compensation will be payable to anybody and if an entire village is acquired the fisherfolk who may be dependent on the river for their livelihood will not get any compensation for loss of livelihood. The next question is that of the quantum of compensation. This has to be paid as per the market value of the property. The market value can be determined by looking at amounts received in respect of similar lands in the neighbourhood in the recent past. This can be highly misleading. In virtually every sale deal a cash component is involved (sometimes very large) which would not be reflected in the sale deed. Moreover, there may not be any sale of lands in the nearby area in the recent past which gives a completely arbitrary power to the authorities to decid e the market value. And, at no stage is the future price of the property to be considered. An agricultural property would be worth much less than commercial property. Similarly property acquired for constructing a special economic zone (SEZ) would subsequently be valued much higher. But the Act itself provides that the use to which the property will be put to in the future is not to be considered. The value is also not to be decided on the basis as to how much it will cost to buy a similar plot of land elsewhere. Besides, the history of such displacement has shown that poor people often do not know how to invest

    june 25, 2011 vol xlvi nos 26 & 27


    money, can be easily misled or misguided and ulti mately be left with nothing. In addition, 30% of marke t value is to be awarded as solatium for the compulsory nature of the transaction.


    We have already seen that the Act is not concerned with rehabilitation of the affected persons. At present there is no central law dealing with rehabilitation and resettlement. However since the late 1970s and especially the 1990s various mega projects have a rehabilitation component. This is partly due to protests and partly due to some of the international donor agencies insisting on rehabilitation as conditionality for loans. Over the last few years many state governments have come out with their own rehabilitation policies and in 2004 the central government notified the National Policy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation of Project Affected Families 2003. A majority of the rehabilitation policies provide for “land for land”. However all of these policies have an escap e clause of “whenever possible”. Since all these are only policies varying from area to area and project to project the central government decided to bring in the rehabilitation bill which is supposed to be the twin of the land acquisition amendment bill.

    The Proposed Land Acquisition Bill

    The following are the major changes which the new bill proposes to bring about:

  • (1) To begin with, it is mentioned that the provisions of Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2009 will apply to acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
  • (2) A new Section 3B is added which says that whenever the government seeks to acquire land involving physical displacement of 400 or more families in a plain area or 200 or more families en masse in tribal or hilly areas or areas covered under the Fifth or Sixth Schedule of the Constitution a social impact assessment will be carried out for purpose of social impact appraisal in the affected area especially in relation to SCs, STs and other vulnerable communities for infrastructural and other facilities in the proposed rehabilitation
  • area as per the Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act.

  • (3) A committee will be set up to decide the issue of land acquisition and it will ensure that only the minimum possible area require d for a project is acquired. The collector has to further ensure agricultural land, especially land under assured irrigation and multi cropped land is acquired only as a measure of last resort. The committee will also consider all possible sites keeping in mind the principle of minimum displacement.
  • (4) The most important change is in respec t of acquisition for private entities. Chapter VII of the original act is omitted. Thus, the chapter which prescribed only limited purposes for which land could be acquired for companies coupled with slightly stringent procedural requirements is deleted. The phrase “public purpose” is redefined and Section 3(f)(3) which defines public purpose reads: “ the provision of land for any other purpose useful to the general public, for which land has been purchased by a person under lawfu l contract or is having the land to the extent of 70%, but the remaining 30% of the total area of land required for the project is yet to be acquired.” The word “person” will mean any company, body of persons, etc. This one is the clincher clause. The government can now openly acquire land for any private company provided the company already has 70% of the land for the project. What is needed is not consent of 70% of landholders but 70% of land. This means that 2% of landowners in the area may own 70% of the land and if they consent the 98% have no choice. More important, the government itself might be owning say 70% of the land in the area. It transfers this land to the company and then acquires the balance 30% forcefully. All this apart, the functioning of these kind of schemes have always acted to the detriment of the poor. Look at the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme in Mumbai wherein 70% of the slum dwellers have to agree to a scheme. In a majority of the cases the developer by coercing, misguiding, and threatening the slum dwellers and even by forging documents generates 70% consent and then the slum dwellers are left high and dry. If this happens in a city like Mumbai, and that too in a widespread manner one can imagine what would happen in the
  • rural areas with little access to lawyers and much more susceptibility to threats.

  • (5) Even this 30% clause may not be neede d if the government acquires land for a joint project or gives it to a company to run for say, 40 years. This would not be treated as land acquired for a company and there would be no necessity to ask the company to purchase 70% of the land.
  • (6) The term “public purpose” is also broadened to include projects such as mining, tourism, sports, etc. Thus, virtually everything is covered.
  • Proposed Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill

    In terms of the history of rehabilitation and resettlement in this country this is a step forward but there are many shortcomings.

  • (1) The bill is applicable to all acquisitions under any law either of the state governments or the union government. This is very crucial. Land is acquired not just under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 but under various other pieces of legislation. Especially important are many of the state laws such as the Industrial Development Corporation laws which lay down a separate procedure for acquisition.
  • (2) An area is to be declared as an affecte d area for many provisions of the law to apply.
  • (3) “Affected families” include, apart from the landowners and tenants, agricultural or non-agricultural labourer, landless person, rural artisan or self-employed person who has been residing or engaging in livelihood in the affected area for five years and who is deprived from carrying on his livelihood.
  • (4) As provided under the Land Acquisition Amendment Bill, a social impact assessment has to be carried out including in respect of community properties, facilities for roads, etc. However, in conformity with its non-participatory nature, the bill does not provide for publication of this report.
  • (5) Though there is provision for land for land it is not mandatory and as far as jobs for the affected families are concerned there are escape clauses.
  • (6) Rehabilitation has to be done of entire communities subject to their meeting the threshold of 400 or more families in the plains or 200 or more families in tribal and hilly areas as also areas in which the Fifth
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    and Sixth Schedules of the Constitution apply. In these cases infrastructural requirements are to be provided. For once it is correctly assumed that compensation, no matter how high, is not necessarily the best answer to displacement and it is also taken into account that acquisition can affec t not just the landowners and tenants but a large number of persons dependent on it.

    (7) Grievance redressal mechanisms have been set up.


    Undoubtedly having a central law on rehabilitation and resettlement is a positive step. However, the history does not inspire confidence in the effectiveness of the working of such an act. A large number of persons are excluded from rehabilitation and resettlement through various devices. The courts blindly rely on affidavits and reports of the government experts to decide whether the policies are actually implemented. Land for land is either disregarded or extremely barren and uncultivable lands are provided. Infrastructural facilities are virtually non-existent in many of the resettlement sites.

    More importantly, both these bills are prepared with the underlying ideology of rapid, massive industrialisation at the hands of the private sector. They speak of trying to minimise displacement but not public participation in deciding which projects are important and which are not. The courts will not go into challenges to acquisition and even now there are no guarantees of jobs or land due to the escape clauses. The object seems to be to allow major transfer of resources to the private sector with some solace to the displaced. These kinds of schemes have historically proved unworkable for the poor.


    1 Dwarkadas Shrinivas vs Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co Ltd, AIR (1954) SC 119, Chiranjit Lal 65. Chowdhuri vs Union of India, AIR (1951) SC 41 and Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar vs State of Gujarat,

    (1995) Supp (1) SCC 596.

    2 Daulat Singh Surana (13.11.2006).

    3 The expression “public purpose” includes (i) the provision of village-sites, or the extension, planned development or improvement of existing villagesites; (ii) the provision of land for town or rural planning; (iii) the provision of land for planned development of land from public funds in pursuance of any scheme or policy of government and subsequent disposal thereof in whole or in part by lease, assignment or outright sale with the object of securing further development as planned; (iv) the provision of land for a corporation owned or controlled by the State; (v) the provision of land for residential purposes to the poor or landless or to persons residing in areas affected by natural calamities, or to persons displaced or affected by reason of the implementation of any scheme undertaken by government, any local authority or a corporation owned or controlled by the State; (vi) the provision of land for carrying out any educational, housing, health or slum clearance scheme sponsored by government or by any authority established by government for carrying out any such scheme, or with the prior approval of the appropriate government, by a local authority, or a society registered under the Societies Registration Act 1860 (21 of 1860), or under any corresponding law for the time being in force in a state, or a cooperative society within the meaning of any law relating to cooperative societies for the time being in force in any state; (vii) the provision of land for any other scheme of development sponsored by government or with the prior approval of the appropriate government, by a local authority;

    (viii) the provision of any premises or building for locating a public office, but does not include acquisition of land for companies .

    4 Gulam Mustafa vs State of Maharashtra, 1976 1 SCC 800. 5 Bajirao Kote vs State of Maharashtra, 1995 2 SCC 442. 6 Arnold Rodricks vs State of Maharashtra, AIR 1966 SC 1788. 7 Nand Kishor Gupta 2010 10 SCC 282. 8 Sarmukh Singh Grewal 1995 4 SCC 489. 9 Smt Somawati and Ors vs State of Gujarat, AIR 63 SC 151. 10 2011 4 SCC 769. 11 Civil Appeal No 3604 of 2011.

    12 “Eminent Domain, Protest and the Discourse on Rehabilitation”, Usha Ramanathan published in M Cernea and Hari Mohan Mathur (ed.), Can Compensation Prevent Impoverishment? (2008) pp 208-29.

    13 Pratibha Nema vs State of MP, 2003 10 SCC 626; Sooraram Pratap Reddy vs District Collector, 2008 9 SCC 552.









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