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also commit to take mitigation actions that are deemed satisfactory).

At the Barcelona session, the developing countries, led by the Africa Group, insisted that the developed countries in the KP make serious attempts to commit to a credible set of “numbers” on the aggregate cut and the individual country cuts. They proposed that discussions on other issues (such as the possible expansion of ways to “offset” the emissions, or of new market mechanisms) in the KP group be suspended to give more time to the discussion on numbers. The developing countries were making the point that all other issues would be secondary or irrelevant if the developed countries do not commit to figures on emission reductions that are serious. At one point in the Bangkok session, the chair of the KP group remarked that if the low numbers are not improved, “we will be the laughing stock of the world” at the end of the Copenhagen conference.

Pointing Fingers at Developing Countries

The third issue is the continued attempt by developed countries to shift the burden of responsibility to developing countries, and in violation of the principles and provisions of the Convention and the Bali A ction Plan, which have clearly demarcated the “common but differentiated responsibilities” principle. At Bangkok and Copenhagen, intense pressure was piled on the developing countries to take on more obligations on mitigation that are beyond what was agreed and mandated in the Convention and the Bali Action Plan, which make a clear distinction between the binding mitigation commitments of developed countries to reduce emissions, and the mitigation actions of developing countries, supported and enabled by finance and technology, and in the context of sustainable development. The US led the charge, stressing its point that the “common responsibilities” have to be worked out, and not just the “differentiated responsibilities”. It even insisted on a special group or special sessions on these “common actions”, thus attempting to blur the carefully devised firewall between the Bali Action Plan’s para 1b(i) on developed countries’ mitigation commitments and para 1b(ii) on developing countries’

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a ctions. A “non-paper 28” on these common actions was prepared by the chair of the LCA group, and it has been mainly r ejected by the G-77 and China.

The attempt to shift responsibilities i ncluded proposals to get developing countries to adhere to new and broad reporting and verification procedures similar to developed countries and beyond what the Bali Action Plan mandates. In addition, there were proposals to get some “advanced developing countries” to adhere to reduction emission targets, to get developing countries in general to commit to have “deviation from business as usual by 15 to 30%” in their emissions levels, both of which were not agreed to in Bali nor are they in the Convention’s provisions, and to introduce a “graduation process” by which some developing countries (those with a significant emission profile and changed economic conditions) have to take on more mitigation obligations. The developed countries are also pressing developing countries to contribute to the international funding of the developing countries’ climate actions, which is against the Convention provision that it is the developed countries which are to fund the agreed full costs incurred by poor countries to prepare their national reports and to fund the agreed full incremental costs of their climate actions.

Non-fulfilment of Compact

The fourth issue is that the adequate means to enable developing countries to take actions are still not forthcoming. The three enabling factors are financial r esources, technology development and transfer and capacity building. The developing countries repeatedly stressed what to them is the heart of the UNFCCC’s compact, that the extent to which developing countries meet their obligations to take climate change actions depends on the e xtent to which the developed countries meet their commitments to developing countries on providing finance and technology, a key principle enshrined in Article 4.7 of the Convention.

In the current negotiations on finance and technology, there are two categories of issues: structural or architectural i ssues, and policy and other issues. On the issues of structure, the G-77 and China in

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August 2008 submitted proposals that a new financial architecture as well as a new technology mechanism be established inside the convention, under the authority of the Conference of Parties. It also wants a new structure for adaptation. The developed countries have been reluctant to accede to the G-77 and China proposals, and came up with their own much weaker i deas on how finance and technology can be strengthened. They argued that existing financial institutions (especially the Global Environment Facility and the World Bank) should be used, and not a new fund inside the convention that the G-77 proposed. They were also against the G-77’s proposal for a new executive body on technology which can take decisions on technology-related policy and oversee actions to transfer technology, arguing that an existing or new advisory group is sufficient.

At Bangkok and Barcelona, there was some progress in the talks on finance structure, with some developed countries seeming to bend towards a financial mechanism to be overseen by the Conference of Parties, though they still insist on the funds to be channelled through existing institutions. On the technology decisionmaking structure, there is yet to be a cceptance by developed countries. At Copenhagen, the G-77 and China can be expected to insist that their proposals to set up new structures – meant after all to make the implementation of commitments made under the convention more effective

– be adopted, at least in principle. If there can be no headway on even the simple question of strengthening the UNFCCC through new structures, then there is little hope of progress in other areas.

On other issues linked to finance, two important questions are the adequacy of the quantum of funds, and the sources of funding (especially on whether funds should be from the public sector or the private sector, especially carbon trading). In September, the United Nations Department on Economics and Social Affairs published a detailed report estimating that $500 bn-$600 bn is required annually by developing countries for mitigation and adaptation, and that most of the funding should come from the public sector, in a Marshall Plan type of programme aimed

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countries are against any relaxation of the present international rules on IPRs. This is not surprising because most patents linked to new climate-related technologies such as renewable energy are owned by companies of developed countries.

Shared Vision

The fifth issue is the North-South distribution of responsibilities in a “long term goal for emissions reductions.” The Bali Action Plan mandates that a “shared vision” for long-term cooperative action be established, that includes such a long-term goal. The discussions on shared vision have been contentious. Developed countries are proposing a 50% global greenhouse gas emissions cut by 2050 from 1990 levels (from 38 bn tonnes in 1990 to 19.3 bn tonnes in 2050). The G-8 in its summit this year announced it is willing to take a 80% cut, and this has been repeated by the US in Bangkok and Barcelona. The figures of a 50% global cut and a 80% developed-countries’ cut by 2050 are contained in drafts (known as “non-papers”) of the “shared vision” issue coming out of Barcelona. Indeed, if there is one outcome in a “political declaration” that the developed countries want from Copenhagen, it is the 50% figure, if possible backed up by the 80% figure.

Behind the figures, however, are very significant implications for developing countries and the future distribution of world emission rights and of world income. A 50% global cut implies global GHG emissions dropping from 38 bn tonnes (of carbon dioxide equivalent) in 1990 to 19.3 bn tonnes in 2050. A 80% cut for developed countries implies a drop from 18.3 bn to 3.6 bn tonnes. This proposal implies by simple deduction that the developing countries

Centre for Study of Social Exclusion and Inclusive Policy, Andhra University and Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group, Kolkata announce national level workshop on

“Resource Politics, Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Displacement in India” (22-24th January, 2010)

Venue: Platinum Jubilee Guest House, Andhra University, Visakhapatnam-530 003

For further details visit www.andhrauniversity.info and www.mcrg.ac.in

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would have to do the rest – that is, accept a 20% cut from 20 bn to 15.7 bn tonnes. As the population of developing countries is expected to double during that period (according to the latest UN estimates), they will end up with a 60% cut per capita. The cuts will be actually even much deeper between 2009 and 2050, b ecause many developing countries have increased their emissions significantly b etween 1990 and the present. As for the developed countries, their population size is projected to be stable between 1990 and 2050, and thus their per capita reduction will be the same as their overall reduction at 80%.

It is unfair to ask developing countries to undertake a per capita emission cut just slightly below (or even the same as, d epending on the base year used) the cut that developed countries are prepared to make. If developed countries were to make a 100% cut between 1990 and 2050, developing countries would still be r equired to make a 52% cut per capita. D eveloped countries would need to reduce their emissions by 213% by 2050, for d eveloping countries to maintain their current per capita emission level. Developed countries would, in other words, need to cut emissions to 0% and create sinks to absorb greenhouse gases equivalent to another 113% of their 1990 emissions. To both developed and developing countries, this may seem impossible. For developing countries it may seem impossible to achieve economic development while maintaining (instead of increasing) their current, low per capita level of emissions. For developed countries it may seem impossible to go beyond a 100% emission cut. But it may need two “impossibles” to make a possible deal.

In order not to exceed the danger level, the world has around 600 bn tonnes of emission of carbon (equivalent to around 2,200 bn tonnes of carbon dioxide) to budget between 1800 and 2050. The d eveloped countries have already emitted 240 bn tonnes of carbon between 1800 and 2008. This is far above their “fair share” of 81 bn tonnes in that period (if their emissions had been at the same ratio as their share of world population). From 1800 to 2008, developed countries have a carbon debt of 159 bn tonnes of carbon (or 583 bn tonnes of carbon dioxide). And,

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given the scenario of a 50% global cut and an 85% developed country cut by 2050, they will emit another 85 bn tonnes of carbon equivalent between 2009 and 2050. Thus, their total emission would be 325 bn tonnes of carbon from 1800 to 2050. Since their fair share is 125 bn tonnes for this p eriod, they have a “carbon debt” of 200 bn tonnes of carbon.

In a fair climate deal, the historical debt would have to be met, at least through sufficient transfers of finance and technology, that would enable developing countries to take their own actions to counter the effects of climate change and to switch to climate-friendly technologies, while maintaining their ability to have adequate economic and social growth and development. Of course, a fair deal also requires developed countries to cut their emissions deeply. The greater the cut, the more will be the atmospheric space left for developing countries. The Copenhagen conference, if it is to be considered a success, will have to go some way at least in pointing to the direction of these solutions, even if it cannot come up with the final solutions.

Thus, some developing countries do not want to agree to a “shared vision” with a goal of reducing global emissions by a certain percentage by a certain year, at least unless and until all the other parts of the equation are discussed transparently and thoroughly, with all the implications set out, and with the adequate finance and technology guaranteed for developing countries to be able to play their part.

Trade and Protectionism

Finally, there is the emerging issue of trade protectionism in the name of climate change. The shadow of this issue has loomed over the climate negotiations, especially after the US House of Representatives approved the Waxman-Markey bill at the end of June 2009, which contains a section requiring the US president to impose border tax adjustment measures on energy-intensive goods imported from developing countries that are deemed not to be taking on the comparable mitigation actions as the US. Such a measure will increase the prices of the imported products. Some European countries may be preparing similar measures. French President, Nicolas Sarkozy said on 10 September he

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“will not accept a system that imports products from countries that don’t respect the rules in France. I will fight for a carbon tax at the borders of Europe.” Referring to the US Congress bill, he said: “I don’t see why if the US can do it and Europe cannot.”

The developing countries are the targets and they will be the losers if these threats are carried out. Compared to the developed countries, they have less funds and technology to make their production systems less polluting. The developed countries, which are mainly responsible for the climate crisis should be assisting developing countries, instead of passing the burden of adjustment onto them.

At the UNFCCC session in Bonn in A ugust, India and other developing countries protested against the trade measures as being against many principles and provisions of the Convention. India proposed that the Copenhagen text include a paragraph stating that

developed country Parties shall not resort to any form of unilateral measures including countervailing border measures, against goods and services imported from developing countries on grounds of protection and stabilisation of climate. Such unilateral measures would violate the principles and provisions of the Convention.

It goes on to cite many such provisions. The developing countries are likely to d emand that such a text be included in the Copenhagen outcome. Some developed countries, particularly the US, can however be expected to argue against it.

The above are some of the major issues where there are wide differences, mainly between developed and developing countries. Even if it is too late for Copenhagen to produce a lengthy and legally binding document, and only a “political declaration” is now expected, these issues will still form the basis for the negotiations on this “political declaration”. After all, a political declaration, especially if it is in the form of a “Decision in the Conference of Parties”, also has a legal status and e ffect, and locks in the framework and p arameters of the future negotiations. C openhagen will thus not be a “picnic”. The emerging view that “nothing will happen in Copenhagen” should not lull the developing countries into complacency, for something surely will happen in C openhagen. The question is what.