"Limited war" or "surgical strikes" in retaliation for the Mumbai terror will be a senseless course of action, not the least because they will take India on the path of escalation and rather than achieve any of the desired ends, could have disastrous consequences in a nuclear neighbourhood. The struggle against terrorism requires us not only to keep our nerves but also to keep our heads. A far more productive approach would be bilateral, multilateral and United Nations-sanctioned diplomatic pressures on Pakistan to act on domestic terror groups. How the US and UK followed up on the Lockerbie bombing of 1988 and forced Libya to abandon state-sponsored terrorism is a relevant example. The options offered by UN Resolution 1373 constitute a related approach.
COMMENTARYdecember 6, 2008 EPW Economic & Political Weekly10Terror, Force and DiplomacySrinath Raghavan“Limited war” or “surgical strikes” in retaliation for the Mumbai terror will be a senseless course of action, not the least because they will take India on the path of escalation and rather than achieve any of the desired ends, could have disastrous consequences in a nuclear neighbourhood. The struggle against terrorism requires us not only to keep our nerves but also to keep our heads. A far more productive approach would be bilateral, multilateral and United Nations-sanctioned diplomatic pressures on Pakistan to act on domestic terror groups. How the US andUK followed up on the Lockerbie bombing of 1988 and forced Libya to abandon state-sponsored terrorism is a relevant example. The options offered byUN Resolution 1373 constitute a related approach.The terrorist attacks on Mumbai have been widely described as India’s “9/11”. Although misleading on several counts, the comparison does hold in one respect. Like the events of 11 September 2001, the terror strikes on Mumbai were India’s first televised acts of terrorism. With 24-hour news channels continuously beaming images, the threat and challenge of terrorism were driven home to millions of Indians as never before. And very like the Americans, the people of at least urban middle and upper class India have responded with outrage. The entire political class has been scath-ingly criticised for incompetence and com-placency. There is a strong and mounting demand for firm and decisive action on the external as well as internal dimen-sions of the problem. As evidence increasingly points towards Pakistan-based terrorist outfits, at the time of writing (3 December) the Indian government has served a demarche to Islamabad and has handed over a list of terrorists for extradition. Several com-mentators and analysts have underscored the need for some form of military action as well. For instance, an editorial in the Hindustan Times contended that “New Delhi needs to look harder at the idea of limited military action, perhaps striking only Laskhar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir”. A former Indian high commissioner to Pakistan has similarly advocated “targeted strikes at Lashkar centres and leadership”. Such claims, and indeed the wider public outcry, are premised on the notion that “mere diplomacy” will not suffice in dealing with Pakistan: we have tried it often enough in the past, but to no avail. The political pressure on the govern-ment from vociferous and insistent public opinion should not be underestimated. In a similar situation after the attack on Parliament in December 2001, New Delhi responded by mobilising the Indian army to the frontiers with Pakistan, resulting in a prolonged military stand-off between the nuclear-armed neighbours. As the then foreign minister, Jaswant Singh, admits in his memoirs, one of the aims of the mobili-sation was “to contain the national mood of ‘teach Pak a lesson’ ”. Given that the other major objective – cessation of cross-border terrorism – was plainly not achieved at that time, it is worth examining what role force and diplomacy can play in our current efforts to contain terrorism. Utility of ForceIn evaluating the utility of force, two issues need to be addressed. First, how exactly do we expect military means to achieve the desired ends? Second, what is the wider political context in which the use of force is being contemplated? A military strike against terrorist infra-structure is expected to present the Pakistan government with two choices: face the prospect of continuing military pressure from India, or accede to its demands and clamp down on the anti-India terrorist groups. It is jejune to suppose that a sym-bolic strike will suffice to serve notice to Islamabad. The claim that the army’s new doctrine of “Cold Start” enhances our ability to punish Pakistan is equally wrong-headed. “Cold Start” is aimed merely at obviating the need for a full-scale mobili-sation as a preliminary to limited military action. But the efficacy of any threat based strategy rests not on the initial damage wrought but on the promise of destruction to come. The credibility of India’s threat will depend on its ability to impose further costs should Pakistan refuse to give in. But in a situation where both sides pos-sess nuclear weapons, New Delhi cannot threaten major escalation. There are serious limits to India’s capacity to impose substantial costs on Pakistan. A limited strike would thus amount to little more than scratching the wound: it may make us feel momentarily better but will not address the underlying problem. More seriously, in the event of an Indian strike Islamabad will most probably opt for a strategy of proportional retaliation. This would place India in the unenviable position of having to decide whether it Srinath Raghavan (srinath.raghavan@gmail.com) is at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore.
COMMENTARYEconomic & Political Weekly EPW december 6, 200811wants to escalate further or pull back with resultant loss of face – both equally unat-tractive options. The pressure at that point would likely force New Delhi to raise the ante; Pakistan will follow suit. Escalation, in short, is inherent in this strategic situa-tion. Indeed the metaphor of an escalator nicely captures these dynamics; for it reminds us of a moving staircase that cannot be stopped: once we get aboard an escalator, we can only step out at the top. Tosuggestthat India can hold the initia-tiveandcangradually turn the screw on Pakistaniseither naïve or disingenuous. Given the presence of nuclear weapons, the consequences of such miscalculation will be disastrous. The political context, too, is unsuitable for the use of force. Pakistan is already confronted with United States attacks against suspected terrorists on its territory adjoining Afghanistan. Armed action by India would stoke the Pakistani establish-ment’s insecurity and would give the upper hand to the more hard line elements. In such a situation, it would be rather difficult for the Pakistan government to desist from striking back, never mind con-ceding India’s demands. We may recall that during the crisis of 2001-02 Pakistan refused to make over the terrorists sought by India. Like New Delhi, Islamabad too has to be sensitive to its public opinion; and most governments will wish to avoid being considered a soft touch. Furthermore, whilst the US and other western countries have extended support to New Delhi, they are exceedingly un-likely to back military action by India. The Indian media have made much of president-elect Barack Obama’s statement that India has a right to protect itself. Yet Washington and London would hardly appreciatea full-blown crisis that necessitates Pakistan to redeploy its forces from the west to the east. Indeed, this is diametrically opposed to Obama’s stated plans for south Asia, which aim at keeping India-Pakistan ties on an even keel so that Pakistan can concen-trate on tackling the Taliban and Al Qaida. Lessons from LockerbieIf the utility of force tends to be exagger-ated in public discourse, the importance of diplomacy is underestimated. There have been a few instances in contemporary international politics where a state has been persuaded to forsake terrorism as an instrument of policy. The most successful example pertains to Libya. A close exami-nation of this case demonstrates that diplomacy was central to this effort.Libya, under the leadership of Muammar Qaddafi, was among the leading state-sponsors of international terrorism. From the early 1970s onwards Libya was linked to a series of high-profile acts of terrorism. In April 1986, Tripoli was implicated in the bombing of a discotheque in Berlin, which left three dead (including two American soldiers) and over 200 injured. In response, the then Reagan administration ordered extensive bombings against sus-pected terrorist camps, military facilities and Qaddafi’s family complex. Far from being coerced, Qaddafi retaliated with numerous terrorist strikes. The most deadly attack came on 21 December 1988, when Pan Am flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie (in Scotland), killing 259 passengers and crew.Three years later, the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) formally indicted two Libyan intelligence agents in connection with the Lockerbie bombing. They also demanded that Libya hand over for trial both the suspects; accept respon-sibility for the actions of Libyan officials involved in the bombing; reveal all that it knew of the episode and allow full access to witnesses and evidence; renounce all forms of terrorism and support to terrorism groups. By this time, US policy had under-gone important changes. President George Bush (the elder) rolled back on Reagan’s policy of excessive reliance on threats or use of force. Under him, and subsequently under Bill Clinton, theUS moved towards stronger multilateral diplomacy on Libya – a shift facilitated by the fact that victims of Pan Am included British and French as well as American citizens.In January 1992, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 731 condemning the bombing and urging Libya to respond to the demands advanced by America and Britain. When Libya failed to comply, the Security Council adopted resolution 748, which imposed a set of multilateral sanctions: banning flights andsales of arms to Libya, among other measures. These sanctions had an impact because they coincided with important economic and political developments within Libya. Falling world oil prices coupled with Qaddafi’s economic mismanagement had resulted in an economic crisis. Politically Qaddafi faced stiff opposition from the tribes, exiles and, most seriously, the Islamist groups. These factors, however, were not suffi-cient to induce a change in Libya’s policy. The crucial turn came after the US andUK began secret negotiations with Libyan officials. In this they were assisted by sev-eral other parties, especially the thenUN secretary general Kofi Annan. The Anglo-American approach was to build reciprocity into the process: every positive step taken by Libya would be matched by concessions. In 1998-99 a deal was struck for the sur-render of the two Libyan suspects to be tried before a Scottish court sitting in the Hague; in response, theUN sanctions were lifted. Subsequently, the European Union (EU) removed some of its sanctions as a quid pro quo to Libya’s renunciation of terrorism. The Lockerbie case was finally settled in August 2003, when Libya agreed to provide compensation to the victims’ families. Moreover, between 1999 and 2003 Libya expelled terrorist groups oper-ating on its territory, closed down training camps, and extradited suspects to other west Asian countries. Options for IndiaRuthlessly simplified, the Libyan case shows that carefully calibrated multilateral diplomacy can work, particularly if the target state’s political and economic system is receptive to change. Whilst it would be incorrect to assume that what worked for Libya will necessarily work for Pakistan, the case suggests ways in which our reper-toire of policy options can be enlarged. For a start, we may note that internal conditions in Pakistan are more suited to a turnaround in established policy thanat any time in the recent past. The NEWEPW Index 2006Readers can download the complete author and article index (PDF files) for 2006 from the EPW web site.The index for 2005 is also available on the same page.
SCHOLARSHIPS 2009-2010
COMMENTARYdecember 6, 2008 EPW Economic & Political Weekly10Terror, Force and DiplomacySrinath Raghavan“Limited war” or “surgical strikes” in retaliation for the Mumbai terror will be a senseless course of action, not the least because they will take India on the path of escalation and rather than achieve any of the desired ends, could have disastrous consequences in a nuclear neighbourhood. The struggle against terrorism requires us not only to keep our nerves but also to keep our heads. A far more productive approach would be bilateral, multilateral and United Nations-sanctioned diplomatic pressures on Pakistan to act on domestic terror groups. How the US andUK followed up on the Lockerbie bombing of 1988 and forced Libya to abandon state-sponsored terrorism is a relevant example. The options offered byUN Resolution 1373 constitute a related approach.The terrorist attacks on Mumbai have been widely described as India’s “9/11”. Although misleading on several counts, the comparison does hold in one respect. Like the events of 11 September 2001, the terror strikes on Mumbai were India’s first televised acts of terrorism. With 24-hour news channels continuously beaming images, the threat and challenge of terrorism were driven home to millions of Indians as never before. And very like the Americans, the people of at least urban middle and upper class India have responded with outrage. The entire political class has been scath-ingly criticised for incompetence and com-placency. There is a strong and mounting demand for firm and decisive action on the external as well as internal dimen-sions of the problem. As evidence increasingly points towards Pakistan-based terrorist outfits, at the time of writing (3 December) the Indian government has served a demarche to Islamabad and has handed over a list of terrorists for extradition. Several com-mentators and analysts have underscored the need for some form of military action as well. For instance, an editorial in the Hindustan Times contended that “New Delhi needs to look harder at the idea of limited military action, perhaps striking only Laskhar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir”. A former Indian high commissioner to Pakistan has similarly advocated “targeted strikes at Lashkar centres and leadership”. Such claims, and indeed the wider public outcry, are premised on the notion that “mere diplomacy” will not suffice in dealing with Pakistan: we have tried it often enough in the past, but to no avail. The political pressure on the govern-ment from vociferous and insistent public opinion should not be underestimated. In a similar situation after the attack on Parliament in December 2001, New Delhi responded by mobilising the Indian army to the frontiers with Pakistan, resulting in a prolonged military stand-off between the nuclear-armed neighbours. As the then foreign minister, Jaswant Singh, admits in his memoirs, one of the aims of the mobili-sation was “to contain the national mood of ‘teach Pak a lesson’ ”. Given that the other major objective – cessation of cross-border terrorism – was plainly not achieved at that time, it is worth examining what role force and diplomacy can play in our current efforts to contain terrorism. Utility of ForceIn evaluating the utility of force, two issues need to be addressed. First, how exactly do we expect military means to achieve the desired ends? Second, what is the wider political context in which the use of force is being contemplated? A military strike against terrorist infra-structure is expected to present the Pakistan government with two choices: face the prospect of continuing military pressure from India, or accede to its demands and clamp down on the anti-India terrorist groups. It is jejune to suppose that a sym-bolic strike will suffice to serve notice to Islamabad. The claim that the army’s new doctrine of “Cold Start” enhances our ability to punish Pakistan is equally wrong-headed. “Cold Start” is aimed merely at obviating the need for a full-scale mobili-sation as a preliminary to limited military action. But the efficacy of any threat based strategy rests not on the initial damage wrought but on the promise of destruction to come. The credibility of India’s threat will depend on its ability to impose further costs should Pakistan refuse to give in. But in a situation where both sides pos-sess nuclear weapons, New Delhi cannot threaten major escalation. There are serious limits to India’s capacity to impose substantial costs on Pakistan. A limited strike would thus amount to little more than scratching the wound: it may make us feel momentarily better but will not address the underlying problem. More seriously, in the event of an Indian strike Islamabad will most probably opt for a strategy of proportional retaliation. This would place India in the unenviable position of having to decide whether it Srinath Raghavan (srinath.raghavan@gmail.com) is at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore.
COMMENTARYEconomic & Political Weekly EPW december 6, 200811wants to escalate further or pull back with resultant loss of face – both equally unat-tractive options. The pressure at that point would likely force New Delhi to raise the ante; Pakistan will follow suit. Escalation, in short, is inherent in this strategic situa-tion. Indeed the metaphor of an escalator nicely captures these dynamics; for it reminds us of a moving staircase that cannot be stopped: once we get aboard an escalator, we can only step out at the top. Tosuggestthat India can hold the initia-tiveandcangradually turn the screw on Pakistaniseither naïve or disingenuous. Given the presence of nuclear weapons, the consequences of such miscalculation will be disastrous. The political context, too, is unsuitable for the use of force. Pakistan is already confronted with United States attacks against suspected terrorists on its territory adjoining Afghanistan. Armed action by India would stoke the Pakistani establish-ment’s insecurity and would give the upper hand to the more hard line elements. In such a situation, it would be rather difficult for the Pakistan government to desist from striking back, never mind con-ceding India’s demands. We may recall that during the crisis of 2001-02 Pakistan refused to make over the terrorists sought by India. Like New Delhi, Islamabad too has to be sensitive to its public opinion; and most governments will wish to avoid being considered a soft touch. Furthermore, whilst the US and other western countries have extended support to New Delhi, they are exceedingly un-likely to back military action by India. The Indian media have made much of president-elect Barack Obama’s statement that India has a right to protect itself. Yet Washington and London would hardly appreciatea full-blown crisis that necessitates Pakistan to redeploy its forces from the west to the east. Indeed, this is diametrically opposed to Obama’s stated plans for south Asia, which aim at keeping India-Pakistan ties on an even keel so that Pakistan can concen-trate on tackling the Taliban and Al Qaida. Lessons from LockerbieIf the utility of force tends to be exagger-ated in public discourse, the importance of diplomacy is underestimated. There have been a few instances in contemporary international politics where a state has been persuaded to forsake terrorism as an instrument of policy. The most successful example pertains to Libya. A close exami-nation of this case demonstrates that diplomacy was central to this effort.Libya, under the leadership of Muammar Qaddafi, was among the leading state-sponsors of international terrorism. From the early 1970s onwards Libya was linked to a series of high-profile acts of terrorism. In April 1986, Tripoli was implicated in the bombing of a discotheque in Berlin, which left three dead (including two American soldiers) and over 200 injured. In response, the then Reagan administration ordered extensive bombings against sus-pected terrorist camps, military facilities and Qaddafi’s family complex. Far from being coerced, Qaddafi retaliated with numerous terrorist strikes. The most deadly attack came on 21 December 1988, when Pan Am flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie (in Scotland), killing 259 passengers and crew.Three years later, the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) formally indicted two Libyan intelligence agents in connection with the Lockerbie bombing. They also demanded that Libya hand over for trial both the suspects; accept respon-sibility for the actions of Libyan officials involved in the bombing; reveal all that it knew of the episode and allow full access to witnesses and evidence; renounce all forms of terrorism and support to terrorism groups. By this time, US policy had under-gone important changes. President George Bush (the elder) rolled back on Reagan’s policy of excessive reliance on threats or use of force. Under him, and subsequently under Bill Clinton, theUS moved towards stronger multilateral diplomacy on Libya – a shift facilitated by the fact that victims of Pan Am included British and French as well as American citizens.In January 1992, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 731 condemning the bombing and urging Libya to respond to the demands advanced by America and Britain. When Libya failed to comply, the Security Council adopted resolution 748, which imposed a set of multilateral sanctions: banning flights andsales of arms to Libya, among other measures. These sanctions had an impact because they coincided with important economic and political developments within Libya. Falling world oil prices coupled with Qaddafi’s economic mismanagement had resulted in an economic crisis. Politically Qaddafi faced stiff opposition from the tribes, exiles and, most seriously, the Islamist groups. These factors, however, were not suffi-cient to induce a change in Libya’s policy. The crucial turn came after the US andUK began secret negotiations with Libyan officials. In this they were assisted by sev-eral other parties, especially the thenUN secretary general Kofi Annan. The Anglo-American approach was to build reciprocity into the process: every positive step taken by Libya would be matched by concessions. In 1998-99 a deal was struck for the sur-render of the two Libyan suspects to be tried before a Scottish court sitting in the Hague; in response, theUN sanctions were lifted. Subsequently, the European Union (EU) removed some of its sanctions as a quid pro quo to Libya’s renunciation of terrorism. The Lockerbie case was finally settled in August 2003, when Libya agreed to provide compensation to the victims’ families. Moreover, between 1999 and 2003 Libya expelled terrorist groups oper-ating on its territory, closed down training camps, and extradited suspects to other west Asian countries. Options for IndiaRuthlessly simplified, the Libyan case shows that carefully calibrated multilateral diplomacy can work, particularly if the target state’s political and economic system is receptive to change. Whilst it would be incorrect to assume that what worked for Libya will necessarily work for Pakistan, the case suggests ways in which our reper-toire of policy options can be enlarged. For a start, we may note that internal conditions in Pakistan are more suited to a turnaround in established policy thanat any time in the recent past. The NEWEPW Index 2006Readers can download the complete author and article index (PDF files) for 2006 from the EPW web site.The index for 2005 is also available on the same page.
SCHOLARSHIPS 2009-2010 
