The Loan Waiver Scheme

MONEY MARKET REVIEWmarch 15, 2008 EPW Economic & Political Weekly28Piyusha Hukeri drafted the initial note and V P Prasanth compiled the accompanying tables and graphs.The Loan Waiver Scheme EPW Research FoundationRural India needs a strategy that strengthens the credit structure, increases the number of bank branches and establishes sound relationship banking. Even as banks are encouraged to increase their rural commitments, an essential aspect of the incentive structure for the banking system should be an assured recovery process. A socio-political environment that nurtures expectations of a loan waiver is not conducive for building a healthy financial system, particularly in rural areas where borrowers have weak bargaining power and bank officials are known to be reluctant to lend at the smallest sign of a poor recovery. Table 1: Total and Indebted Farm Households and Their Source of Debt by Landholding Size, 2003Size Class of Total Total Loans fromLand Possessed Households Indebted InstitutionalNon-Institutional(Hectares) (%)HouseholdsAgenciesAgencies (%) (%) (%) <0.01 1.4 1.3 22.677.40.01 – 0.40 32.8 30.0 43.3 56.70.41 – 1.00 31.7 29.8 52.8 47.21.01 -2.00 18.0 18.9 57.6 42.3Up to 2.00 83.9 79.9 51.3 49.72.01 – 4.00 10.5 12.5 65.1 35.04.01 - 10.00 4.8 6.4 68.8 31.110.00+ 0.9 1.2 67.632.4All sizes 100.0 100.0 57.7 42.4Source: NSSO, Situation Assessment Survey of Farmers, 2003.The loan waiver scheme announced in the latest budget of the central government will go down in history as the one damaging the interest of the very small and marginal farmers that it has mainly sought to serve. Even the apparent political objectives may not be achieved as the scheme, when it is implemented, is likely to create a serious schism amongst vast sections of the farm community.1 Against the Long-term Interest It may be recalled that the earlier agri-cultural and rural debt relief scheme of 1990-91 for small borrowers had left a serious scar on the credit delivery ar-rangements precisely for such small bor-rowers and borrowers in the agricultural sector. There may have been elements in the financial sector reform measures of the 1990s such as provisioning and clean-sing of banks’ balance sheets, which per-suaded banks to desist from lending in favour of the farm community and other small debtors, but a major reason for the banks to violate priority sector and other guidelines was the unhealthy socio-political environment created against the discipline of loan repayments. It was widely recog-nised how the bank personnel perceived that difficulties in loan recoveries in rural lending with poor asset backings were a blot on their career prospects.The consequences in the form of re-duced lending was there for all to see. Amongst scheduled commercial banks, the number of small borrowal accounts with credit limits of Rs 25,000 or less had attained a peak of 62.55 million in March 1992, but by March 2001, these had dwin-dled to one-half at 37.25 million; the per-centage share of these small borrowal ac-counts in aggregate bank credit had dropped from the peak of 25.4 per cent to 7 per cent during the period. A similar de-cline had occurred in direct finance for agriculture, with the number of loan ac-counts declining from 27.34 million in March 1992 to a low of 19.56 million in March 2001 and their share in aggregate bank credit receding from a peak of about 15 per cent to 8 per cent.The neglect of agriculture by the formal financial institutions has thrown the culti-vator households further into the clutches of moneylenders and other non-institu-tional agencies. For the first time after four decades (1951-1991), the share of in-stitutional credit for cultivator households slipped from 66.3 per cent in 1991 to 61.1 per cent in 2002 as per the decennial all-India debt and investment survey (AIDIS). The obverse is the steep rise in the share of non-institutional agencies in cultiva-tors’ debt from 30.6 per cent in 1991 to 38.9 per cent in 2002 or that of money-lenders from 17.5 per cent to 26.8 per cent. And what is more, as shown in Table 1 and Graph A (p 29), the dependence on non-institutional agencies is high amongst low landholding classes; it is as high as 47 to 77 per cent amongst farmers owning be-low one hectare of land and 42 per cent for the 1 to 2 hectare category.All meaningful studies on the current agricultural crisis tell us that farmers’ in-debtedness is only a symptom; there are deeper issues in the twin dimensions of the crisis – an agrarian crisis and an agri-cultural development crisis. The agricul-tural development crisis has manifested itself in reduced overall agricultural growth accompanied by declining produc-tivity and profitability of farm operations, which have accentuated the adverse con-ditions faced in the livelihoods of small and marginal farmers. The neglect of agri-culture in plan resource allocations and

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MONEY MARKET REVIEWmarch 15, 2008 EPW Economic & Political Weekly30Table 4: Comparison of Call, Overnight CBLO and Repo RatesWeek Ending Weighted Average Rates (in %) Daily Average Volumes (Rs Crore) Call Overnight CBLO Repo Call Overnight CBLO Repo 4-Jan-08 6.52 5.746.2413,36533,528 14,97711-Jan-08 6.076.006.1114,16031,68216,69818-Jan-08 6.376.306.0311,37131,62815,87925-Jan-08 7.086.327.0118,31840,26415,9421-Feb-08 7.176.326.8817,46836,77618,9228-Feb-08 6.345.946.1415,03739,09215,15615-Feb-08 6.236.066.2211,29136,22820,01422-Feb-08 7.807.647.7012,27933,10217,86529-Feb-08 7.736.887.1511,87736,48417,541Source: The Clearing Corporation of India Ltd (CCIL).Table 3: Weighted Averages of Daily Call/Notice Rates in Per Cent Per Annum: Simple Statistical Characteristics Month/Week Simple StandardCoefficientofSimple StandardCoefficient Mean*DeviationVariationMean * Deviation of Variation (in %)$ (in %)$ Call Money Notice Money **January 2008 All four weeks 6.51 0.64 9.88 6.10 0.93 15.18 257.140.608.426.591.2819.48 18(RF)* 6.290.6410.18 5.660.63 11.08 116.220.416.605.840.8714.85 4(RF)*6.510.639.696.330.8813.95 February 2008 All five weeks 6.96 0.87 12.44 6.54 0.98 14.96 29(RF)* 7.461.3317.78 6.97 1.3419.22 227.710.192.467.340.648.78 15(RF)*6.170.111.856.240.243.83 8 6.300.182.885.710.569.83 1 (RF)* 7.210.28 3.856.411.1618.18** Separate reportings began on March 15, 2005. * Including data for reporting Fridays (RF). $ Based on original unrounded figures.Source: RBI. Table 5: Details of Central Government Market Borrowing(Amount in Rs crore)Date of Auction Nomenclature Type of Notified Competitive Bids Competitive Bids Indicative Devolvement on of Loan Auction Amount Received Accepted YTM at Cut-off Primary Dealers Price (in %) (Rs Crore) Number Amount Number Amount8-Feb-08 8.20%2022Normal5,00020713,844614,9857.62% (Rs 104.97) –8-Feb-08 8.33% 2036Normal4,000245 11,652 87 3,9917.77% (Rs 106.36) –7-Feb-08 12.25%2010MSS4,0001039,580413,9987.52% (Rs110.20) 14-Feb-08 6.57% 2011MSS 4,000103 7,272 6 2,315 7.48% (Rs97.57) Source: RBI Press Releases.credit of about Rs 2,25,000 crore as at the end of March 2007, about Rs 1,18,000 (52.5 per cent) would pertain to small and marginal farmers. Of this latter amount, the government has placed the overdue number at Rs 50,000 crore as at the end of December 2007, that is, at about 42 per cent of the outstanding amount. In terms of the households covered, it is said to be 30 mil-lion out of 35 million small and marginal farmers indebted. On the face of it, both the overdue amount estimated by the government and the number of farm households covered for the marginal and small farmers category appear unduly high and inflated. In the case of the bigger farmers, the estimated overdue amount of Rs 10,000 crore works out to just below 10 per cent of the probable amount outstand-ing, which appears realistic. That apart, the whole scheme is sure to create discontent-ment amongst a large section of the farm-ing community. In the first place, it will benefit only those who carry overdue loans for wilful or non-wilful reasons. Vast segments of farmers prefer to re-pay their loans and they will not get any benefit. Another size-able category – over 50 per cent of the in-debted category – borrows from moneylenders and other non-institutional agencies, who will also not get any respite. And finally, if the NSSO data are to be believed, more than one-half of the total farmer households –46million out of 89 million – are not indebted to any agency, official or non-official, but their sufferance due to the farm crisis cited earlier is as acute as in the case of the indebted farmers and their agonising survival will persist all the more because the government has part-ed with as much as Rs 60,000 crore on loan waivers and not on badly needed developmental programmes. be candid, the loan waiver policy fits in with the proclivities for interventionist and micro management drive exhibited by the union finance minister because public sector banks, which dominate the banking system, are under government control. In that respect, he has shown scant respect for the autonomy of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). He has been directly advising banks to pursue his preferred levels of in-terest rates on bank deposits and lendings. In the same vein, as a knee-jerk reaction to the glaring agrarian crisis, he has directed public sector banks to double agricultural credit flow in a period of three years from 2004-05, that is, to increase the credit flow at a rate of 30 per cent per annum. But, it was obvious that imposing such a heavy task on a weak institutional struc-ture would have its repercussions first, on the quality and purposes of lending, and second, on the processes of loan recovery. Studies have shown how banks have sought to fulfil the target of doubling bank credit disbursements by resorting to large amounts of indirect lending and by ex-tending so-called farm credit through urban and metropolitan bank branches as well as large-size loan accounts of Rs 2 lakh and above.A major achievement of banking re-forms has been the cleansing of bank books through accelerated recoveries and provisioning. In the case of public sector banks, agriculture non-performing assets (NPAs) have been reduced from 13.7 per cent of agricultural advances in March 2001 to 3.2 per cent in March 2007. The policy of doubling of bank credit is sure to arrest this improvement. The promise of loan waiver now will definitely hurt this process of loan recovery and reductions inNPAs.As emphasised at the outset, the very nature of the measure, when implemented, would surely divide the farm community rather badly. As per theNSSO data, of the 89 million farm households, 75 million (or 84 per cent) are marginal (holding up to 1 hectare) and small (1-2 hectare) farmers. Of the latter, only 35 million or 46 per cent are indebted to any agency. In turn, out of the indebtedness of small and marginal farmers, only about 51 per cent are indebted to institutional agencies. Independent data from banking sources also suggest that of the estimated outstanding agricultural

MONEY MARKET REVIEWEconomic & Political Weekly EPW march 15, 200831Table 6: Auctions of 91-Day Treasury Bills(Amount in Rs crore) Date of Notified Bids Tendered Bids Accepted Subscription Cut-off Cut-off AmountAuction AmountDevolvedPrice Yeild Outstanding- No Face Value No Face Value on PDs (Rupees) Rate on the Date (Amount) (Amount)(Amount) (%)ofIssue (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)2007 Feb 7 2,000.00 88 4,361.96 33 2,000.00 0.00 98.16 7.52 30,665.65 (1) (2,000.00) (1) (2,000.00) [98.17] [7.48] Feb14 2,000.00 67 2,322.77 59 2,000.00 0.00 98.02 8.10 30,445.57 (4) (705.44) (4) (705.44) [98.09] [7.81] Feb 21 2,000.00 128 7,019.30 33 2,000.00 0.00 98.10 7.77 29,595.57 (4) (1,900.00) (4) (1,900.00) [98.12] [7.69] Feb 28 2,000.00 103 6,127.05 31 2,000.00 0.00 98.17 7.48 33,282.57 (3) (4,250.00) (3) (4,250.00) [98.19] [7.39] 2008 Jan30 2,000.00 48 1,616.58 24 500.00 0.00 98.22 7.27 41,890.00 (2) (883.32) (2) (883.32) [98.23] [7.23] Feb 6 2,000.00 62 2,540.28 54 2,000.00 0.00 98.22 7.27 45,090.00 (4) (2,300.00) (4) (2,300.00) [98.24] [7.27] Feb 13 2,500.00 67 2,488.37 26 1,042.77 0.00 98.22 7.27 43,133.00 (3) (703.00) (3) (703.00) [98.22] [7.27] Feb20 500.00 47 2,110.66 7 500.00 0.00 98.19 7.39 43,513.00 (4) (1,350.00) (4) (1,350.00) [98.20] [7.35] Feb27 500.00 56 1,733.37 26 500.00 0.00 98.18 7.44 43,267.00 (2) (748.97) (2) (748.97) [98.19] [7.39] Figures in parentheses in cols 3 to 6 represent numbers and amounts of non-competitive bids which are not included in the total. Figures in the square brackets under cols 8 and 9 represent weighted average price and respective yield. Table 7: Auctions of 182-Day Treasury Bills(Amount in Rs crore) Date of Notified Bids Tendered Bids Accepted Subscription Cut-off Cut-off AmountAuction AmountDevolvedPriceYieldOutstanding No Face Value No Face Value on PDs (Rupees) Rate on the Date (Amount) (Amount)(Amount) (%)ofIssue2007 Feb7 1,500.00 57 3,790.00 12 1,500.00 0.00 96.34 7.62 20,112.83 (0) (0.00) (0) (0.00) [96.36] [7.58] Feb 21 1,500.00 55 3,903.00 8 1,500.00 0.00 96.29 7.73 19,612.83 (0) (0.00) (0) (0.00) [96.32] [7.66] 2008 Feb6 1,500.00 60 3,267.00 26 1,500.00 0.00 96.50 7.27 22,085.00 (0) (0.00) (0) (0.00) [96.52] [7.23] Feb20 500.00 40 1,822.00 12 500.00 0.00 96.38 7.53 19,585.00 (0) (0.00) (0) (0.00) [96.42] [7.45] Figures in the square brackets represent weighted average price and the respective yield. Figures in brackets represent numbers and amounts of non-competitive bids which are not included in the total.Table 8: Auctions of 364-Day Treasury Bills(Amount in Rs crore) Date of Notified Bids Tendered Bids Accepted Subscription Cut-off Cut-off AmountAuction AmountDevolvedPriceYieldOutstanding No Face Value No Face Value on PDs (Rupees) Rate on the Date (Amount) (Amount)(Amount) (%)ofIssue2007 Feb 14 2,000.00 69 8,065.50 5 2,000.00 0.00 92.75 7.84 49,758 (1) (96.00) (1) (96.00) [92.77] [7.81] Feb28 2,000.00 65 4,575.00 28 2,000.00 0.00 92.84 7.73 50,758 (0) (0.00) (0) (0.00) [92.91] [7.65] 2008 Jan30 2,000.00 75 3,185.00 42 2,000.00 0.00 93.05 7.49 60,346 (0) (0.00) (0) (0.00) [93.09] [7.44] Feb13 3,000.00 112 9,149.00 44 3,000.00 0.00 93.06 7.48 61,754 (2) (503.70) (2) (503.70) [93.09] [7.44] Feb27 1,000.00 71 3,690.00 14 1,000.00 0.00 93.00 7.55 60,754 (0) (0.00) (0) (0.00) [93.03] [7.51] Figures in the square brackets represent weighted average price and the respective yield. Figures in brackets represent numbers and amounts of non-competitive bids which are not included in the total.2 Money, Gilt-Edged and Forex MarketsThe surplus liquidity situation in the first half of February shifted to a deficit mode in the second half as outflows increased while inflows remained subdued. Con-sequently, in the latter half of the month, the call rates ruled above the repo rate, secondary market turnover fell and yields firmed up, though the RBI supported the market through liquidity adjustment facility (LAF) repo window. Given the weaknesses in domestic stock markets and repatriation of mega initial public offering (IPO) refunds by foreign in-stitutional investors (FIIs) as well as poor performance of some IPOs in February, the investment-related inflows were subdued. Due to the constraints imposed by the Fis-cal Responsibility and Budget Manage-ment (FRBM) Act, 2003, the government expenditure also remained subdued.Thus, the inflows were lower while the outflows through central and state dated securities andMSS auctions exerted pressure on li-quidity. Yet, there were expectations of soft interest rates spurred by reductions in home loan rates effected by some domi-nant institutions. In the forex market, the forward premia for short tenures ruled at a discount due to demand-supply mismatches, though the spot rupee depreciated. Amidst the confusion regarding the statement of the petroleum secretary about conferring statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) status on oil bonds, yields rose sharply across maturities, which were however reversed following the clarifica-tion that it was a proposal and not a decision. However, the market turned cautious due to the petrol and diesel price hike effected during the month, as the international crude oil prices were rising rapidly and began ruling above $ 100 per barrel. Following the announcement of the union budget, the market sentiments be-came buoyant, as the central government has budgeted a lower borrowing schedule for the next financial year as compared to the current year. 2.1 CallMoney Market The volatility in the short-term money market increased in February as compared to that in January as the liquidity situation fluctuated with rates ruling near the reverse repo rate of 6 per cent in the first half of the month and then, as the pres-sure on liquidity mounted, the rates ruled even above the repo rate of 7.75 per cent (Tables 2 and 3, p 29, 30). The month began with the call rates easing from 7.64 per cent on February 1, the first reporting Friday, to 6.02 per cent on February 8 despite outflows towards dated securities auction. But the overnight call rates rose in the next week due to MSS

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MONEY MARKET REVIEWEconomic & Political Weekly EPW march 15, 200833Appendix Table: Secondary Market Operations in Government Papers: NDS and NDS-OM Deals(Amount in rupees crore) Descriptions Week Ending February 2008: Yield to Maturity on Actual Trading Total for the Month 29 22 15 8 1 of February 2008 AMT YTM CY AMT YTM CY AMT YTM CY AMT YTM CYAMT YTM CYAMT YTM CY1TreasuryBills A91-DayBills 159.877.31 227.047.32 188.277.13 410.177.09 258.287.07 1243.637.16 B 182-Day Bills 256.10 7.18 304.66 7.30 658.76 7.07 844.92 7.04 588.77 6.93 2653.21 7.07 C 364-Day Bills 621.05 7.33 1071.05 7.27 2187.45 7.32 661.61 7.18 2006.50 7.10 6547.66 7.23 2 GOI DatedSecurities ARegular(%:Year) 11.40 , 2008 ---25.06 7.02 11.21 10.00 7.4611.17 ------35.06 7.1411.2011.50 , 2008 0.067.8911.41 ---10.00 6.9611.37 ------10.06 6.97 11.37 12.00 , 2008 21.56 7.58 11.91 ---25.00 7.13 11.88 14.00 7.17 11.87 10.00 7.50 11.87 70.56 7.33 11.895.48, 2009 1065.00 7.47 5.62 1085.00 7.45 5.62 1285.85 7.41 5.62 1705.00 7.38 5.62 800.00 7.44 5.62 5940.85 7.42 5.62 6.65,2009 890.00 7.51 6.71 595.00 7.58 6.72 255.70 7.46 6.71 2500.45 7.40 6.71 1099.79 7.44 6.71 5340.94 7.45 6.71 6.96 , 2009 OMC SB 50.00 8.12 7.04 50.00 8.10 7.04 ---655.00 8.02 7.04 ---755.00 8.03 7.047.07 , 2009OMC SB35.00 8.287.16 ------------35.00 8.287.167.33,2009OIL MKT BONDS --- - -- - - -775.008.047.38 ---775.008.047.3811.99 , 2009 30.00 7.6111.47 5.007.7611.48 ------0.49 7.3111.40 35.49 7.6311.47 5.87 , 2010 365.12 7.50 6.04 330.00 7.51 6.04 779.95 7.41 6.03 2067.25 7.40 6.03 1950.00 7.44 6.04 5492.32 7.43 6.03 7.55,2010 6.10 7.52 7.55 40.31 7.52 7.55 35.84 7.44 7.53 240.50 7.43 7.53 85.00 7.48 7.54 407.75 7.45 7.54 11.30 , 2010 111.00 7.54 10.45 15.00 7.54 10.45 326.00 7.47 10.42 288.00 7.50 10.42 3193.00 7.47 10.41 3933.00 7.48 10.4111.50 , 2010 82.00 7.62 10.65 ---------250.007.4110.58 332.00 7.4710.60 12.25 , 2010 256.80 7.58 11.15 205.30 7.58 11.14 40.00 7.49 11.12 427.00 7.47 11.11 775.00 7.44 11.09 1704.10 7.49 11.116.57, 2011 ------127.007.446.73 ------127.007.446.73 9.39,2011 11.00 7.58 8.92 0.29 7.84 8.99 - - - 10.00 7.45 8.881045.00 7.51 8.90 1066.29 7.51 8.9012.32 , 2011 50.00 7.6010.99 16.88 7.6010.98 ------0.507.8011.01 67.38 7.6010.99 6.85, 2012 70.00 7.63 7.04 ---10.00 7.49 7.01 ---0.05 7.50 7.01 80.05 7.61 7.047.40, 2012 ------15.01 7.447.41110.407.45 7.41 ---125.417.447.41 7.27,2013 1725.00 7.55 7.36 716.26 7.54 7.36 698.86 7.44 7.33 1131.26 7.44 7.33 1369.60 7.48 7.34 5640.98 7.50 7.3512.40 , 2013 ---25.00 7.7210.28 ---0.127.5010.17 ---25.12 7.7210.28 7.37,2014 196.77 7.58 7.45 83.82 7.59 7.45 90.00 7.43 7.39 235.00 7.47 7.41 170.00 7.48 7.41 775.59 7.51 7.4210.00 , 2014 ---5.53 7.62 8.960.057.42 8.87 ------5.587.62 8.95 11.83 , 2014 55.00 7.68 9.75 30.00 7.68 9.74 3.90 7.50 9.65 ---3.00 7.53 9.66 91.90 7.67 9.74 7.38,2015 60.00 7.58 7.46 236.60 7.56 7.46 30.00 7.43 7.40 30.50 7.49 7.43 90.00 7.46 7.42 447.10 7.53 7.44 7.61,2015OIL MKT COGOI BOND - - - - - - 20.00 8.44 7.96 - - - - - - 20.00 8.44 7.96 7.59,2016 170.40 7.60 7.59 230.00 7.61 7.60 805.15 7.50 7.55 725.00 7.50 7.55 236.05 7.54 7.57 2166.60 7.52 7.56 7.46,2017 0.45 7.63 7.55 1.05 7.60 7.53 3.00 7.49 7.47 2.00 7.50 7.48 4.30 7.50 7.48 10.80 7.51 7.49 7.49,2017 1486.01 7.58 7.53 1629.06 7.58 7.53 2372.50 7.47 7.48 1891.35 7.49 7.49 2375.35 7.51 7.50 9754.27 7.52 7.51 7.99,2017 18487.69 7.61 7.7918036.20 7.58 7.78 15602.25 7.46 7.72 15836.85 7.48 7.7219618.45 7.51 7.7487581.44 7.53 7.757.99, 2017FERTSB ---43.67 8.418.07 ---------43.67 8.418.07 8.07,2017 400.00 7.59 7.83 - - - 743.12 7.48 7.77 687.75 7.51 7.79 531.03 7.52 7.80 2361.90 7.51 7.79 6.25, 2018 27.50 7.78 6.98 5.00 7.62 6.90 15.05 7.58 6.88 9.86 7.58 6.88 ---57.41 7.68 6.9312.60 , 2018ONTAP 0.097.989.4825.10 8.38 9.73 ---------25.19 8.38 9.73 6.05, 2019 ---15.60 7.63 7.01 ---2.02 7.62 6.86 0.60 7.68 6.89 18.22 7.63 6.99 7.75 , 2021 OMC SB ------6.45 8.30 8.12 ---4.00 8.23 8.07 10.45 8.28 8.10 7.94,2021 10.00 7.82 7.86 65.00 7.79 7.84 65.00 7.66 7.76 65.15 7.66 7.76 90.00 7.72 7.80 295.15 7.71 7.79 8.13 , 2021 OMC SB 0.91 8.39 8.31 1.92 8.31 8.25 1.04 8.308.24 - - -5.008.258.218.878.288.23 8.15 , 2022 FCI SB 0.10 8.36 8.30 20.60 8.43 8.34 ------73.00 8.25 8.22 93.70 8.29 8.25 8.20,2022 268.00 7.83 7.95 830.00 7.76 7.91 2233.24 7.60 7.80 2902.00 7.63 7.82 1201.50 7.68 7.85 7434.74 7.65 7.83 8.35,2022 1005.00 7.83 8.00 605.00 7.77 7.96 2200.07 7.64 7.87 2395.00 7.65 7.881895.08 7.70 7.91 8100.15 7.69 7.91 6.17,2023 0.10 7.86 7.25 10.00 7.58 7.06 0.05 8.97 8.02 5.00 7.73 7.16 1.00 7.84 7.24 16.15 7.65 7.11 8.01 , 2023 OMC SB 19.70 8.45 8.33 34.06 8.43 8.32 21.85 8.34 8.25 338.05 8.38 8.28 31.20 8.26 8.19 444.86 8.38 8.288.20, 2023OMC SB ------50.95 8.31 8.21 ------50.95 8.31 8.21 8.30 , 2023 FERT SB 214.89 8.48 8.43 43.84 8.40 8.37 - - - 327.34 8.34 8.33 208.36 8.29 8.30 794.43 8.37 8.35 8.03 , 2024 FCI SB 125.30 8.49 8.37 ---------46.00 8.25 8.20 171.30 8.43 8.33 8.20 , 2024 OMC SB 122.16 8.48 8.40 43.52 8.44 8.38 23.34 8.33 8.29 - - - 46.84 8.32 8.29 235.86 8.43 8.36 7.95 , 2025 OMC SB 1.89 8.41 8.29 68.96 8.40 8.28 2037.70 8.40 8.28139.008.36 8.26 - - -2247.55 8.40 8.287.95, 2026 FERTSB50.00 8.53 8.40 ------------50.00 8.53 8.40 8.40 , 2026 OMC SB 0.24 8.40 8.40 35.56 8.46 8.45 8.56 8.37 8.38 - - - 14.04 8.32 8.34 58.40 8.41 8.41 8.23 , 2027 FCI SB ---------56.62 8.36 8.33 174.12 8.31 8.29 230.74 8.32 8.308.23, 2027 ------29.65 8.37 8.34 ------29.65 8.37 8.34 8.23 , 2027 FCI SB 51.61 8.47 8.42 535.85 8.46 8.41 10.40 8.35 8.33 ------597.86 8.46 8.416.01, 2028 ---20.107.92 7.42 2.757.867.293.407.917.42 ---26.25 7.917.417.95,2032 312.527.987.97726.06 7.877.884396.97 7.77 7.803033.057.80 7.83960.007.827.849428.60 7.80 7.828.32 , 2032 ------10.00 7.867.9310.00 7.867.93 ---20.007.867.93 7.50, 2034 0.15 8.05 7.98 ---0.03 8.11 8.03 ---5.90 7.72 7.69 6.08 7.73 7.708.33,2036 8966.947.998.039027.25 7.88 7.9414125.47 7.75 7.8113238.75 7.79 7.8510799.45 7.82 7.8756157.86 7.83 7.89 Sub-total 36810.06 7.71 7.78 35523.97 7.69 7.75 48536.20 7.63 7.70 51865.96 7.62 7.61 49162.95 7.59 7.90 221899.14 7.64 7.74 B RBI’s OMO: Sales 225.00 - - 6.00 - - 11.00 - - 1 - - 95 - - 338.00 - -Purchase 2465.00 --195.00 -----------2660.00 --Sub-total 2690.00 --201.00 --11.00 --1.00 --95.00 --2998.00 -- (A+B) 39500.06 7.71 7.78 35724.97 7.69 7.75 48547.20 7.63 7.70 51866.96 7.62 7.61 49257.95 7.59 7.90 224897.14 7.64 7.743 MarketRepo 109641.50 107649.40 123391.80 92809.18 95796.25 529288.13 4 State Govt Securities 620.67 8.14 8.63 906.73 8.00 8.10 137.16 7.89 8.52 163.96 7.95 8.17 549.05 7.93 8.05 2377.57 8.01 8.26 Grand total (1 to 4) 150799.25 145883.85 175110.64 146756.80 148456.80 767007.34 (-) Means no trading. YTM = Yield to maturity in per centage per annum. CY = Current yield in per cent per annum. SGL = (RBI’s) Subsidiary General Ledger. OMO = Open Market Operations. OMC SB= Oil Marketing Companies Special Bonds . NDS = Negotiated Dealing System. OM = Order Matching Segment. Securities with small-size transactions (Rs 5 crore or less) have been dropped from the above list but included in the respective totals. (1) Yields are weighted yields, weighted by the amounts of each transaction. (2) Current yield has not been worked out for treasury bills. (3) For Floating Rate Bonds (FRB’s) Current yields are based on the latest half-year yield determined in the auction..

7 7.5 8 8.5

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