LETTER FROM SOUTH ASIAmarch 15, 2008 EPW Economic & Political Weekly8Democracy Interrupted?S Akbar ZaidiPakistan has voted for a democratic future but Pervez Musharraf is still in the spotlight. Washington is fully capable of converting the victory of the people into a defeat by forcing a deal between the new government and the former general. Another factor that will outline the contours of “democratisation” is the tradition in Pakistani politics of accommodating and compromising with the military. S Akbar Zaidi (azaidi@fascom.com) is a social scientist based in Karachi. So what happened to the great demo-cratic revolution which supposedly overturned retired general president Pervez Musharraf’s cart on February 18? If, as all participants, observers and ana-lysts correctly believe, the elections of February 18 were an anti-Musharraf vote, in which the people of Pakistan signalled their wish to put an end to the dispensa-tion headed by the former general since 1999 and wanted him gone, why is he still in power? The vote went against not justthe ruling Pakistan Muslim League’s (Quaid-e-Azam) Shaukat Aziz, who made a very hasty retreat to safer and more lucrative shores well before the votes were cast, but was a resounding rejection of muchof what Musharraf stood for and propagated. Interestingly, this rejection did not include the people rejecting Musharraf’s notion of lifestyle liberalism, also known as moderate enlightenment. The electorate signalled their wish not just for a superficial notion of moderate en-lightenment, but importantly voted for a political liberalism as well, in which basic rights related to some form of participa-tion and representation and were just as important as were liberal lifestyle choices. The electorate rejected both fundamental-ism and authoritarianism and the archi-tecture that each endorsed and supported.Clearly, this was a particularly important vote and result by any sense of imagina-tion. Yet, why has the process for demo-cratic transition and/or transformation stalled? Is this merely because the elected mandate is split between the two largest parties and the idea of coalition politics is alien to Pakistan’s politics, or is there something far more sinister, substantive and powerful at work? Or, as thosewho are taking a wait-and-see approach say, this is merely how the new politics will be done? Perhaps the answer to this and related ques-tions lies in two separate spheres, both overlapping. On the one hand, the domestic politics of compromise and collaboration may continue to haunt the apparent victors of the February 18 elections for some time to come resulting in the process of demo-cratisation slowing down. And on the other, Musharraf’s longevity may be very closely linked to support from the administration in Washington. Either way, Pakistan’s democratic transition is being curtailed and interrupted.Endorsing the Military The politics of Pakistan’s political parties has been one largely of compromise and collaboration with the military, by far the largest and most prominent and powerful institution and organisation in the coun-try. In each of the military coups that have taken place in the past, political actors have either asked the military to intervene directly in the civilian dispensation or have endorsed the coup that has taken place once the military has stepped into power. In 1977, those political parties that were opposed to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s People’s Party, including many who claimed to have secular roots, pressed Zia-ul-Haq to intervene and dismiss Bhutto and hold fresh elections after the polls earlier that year had been actively rigged. Zia fulfilled this request and ended up staying for 11 years. Similarly, Musharraf too was wel-comed in by opponents of Nawaz Sharif in 1999, and those who wanted him out were willing to support a general coming to power. Moreover, even when not directly in power as in the 1988-99 period, the military was constantly at hand, being asked by politicians to intervene in the democratic and political process. The dismissal, twice, of both the democratically elected prime ministers in this period could not have come about without sections of the ubiquitous military apparatus being involved, often at the behest of political actors. Politics or democracy in Pakistan has seldom been immune to military inter-vention and involvement. However, the responsibility for this intrusion may not simply be that the military prefers to run Pakistan’s politics because it feels that it knows best, but that different breeds of politicians find opportunities to compro-mise with and depend upon the military to get them into power. Political parties in