What is an electoral wave?

Is it appropriate to describe Bharatiya Janata Party’s victory in the recent Lok Sabha polls as an outcome of an electoral wave? There are two explanations to this question. The pro-Modi explanation, which draws its inspiration from the media-centric Modi campaign, focuses on BJP’s electoral performance - number of seats won by the party,  BJP’s spread across India, its increasing social base etc -- to suggest that Narendra Modi’s charm as a leader transformed him into a political phenomenon and paved the way for BJP’s impressive victory. On the contrary, many political observers do not subscribe to this view. For them, BJP’s vote share (around 32%) clearly demonstrates the fact that a sizeable majority of voters at the national level rejected the party. Therefore, BJP’s success was an outcome of a fragmented opposition.

These two different public positions revolve around the idea of an electoral wave without paying any serious attention to a few fundamental issues concerning the meanings, significance and possible factors that might constitute a wave like electoral response. As a result, although the electoral victories of Congress in 1971 and 1984 and Janata Party in 1977 are often described as “electoral waves”, the recent debate does not produce any satisfactory framework for evaluating electoral outcomes in a comparative mode. 

The idea of “electoral wave” in Indian context could be evoked in three difference ways —electoral wave as a result of shirking competitive politics (at least at the national level); electoral wave as an outcome of higher voter turnout and electoral wave as an effect of higher vote share.    

First of all, “electoral wave” could be seen in relation to the discursive constitution of competitive politics. Congress’s performance in four general elections (1952-1967) cannot be called an electoral wave despite the fact the party managed to get clear majority in Lok Sabha and its actual vote share was relatively much higher. The lack of formidable opposition during these years no doubt produced the political idiom of anti-Congressism; yet, the Congress as a “system” continued to gain from its virtual dominance. In fact, Congress’s victory in 1971, which is often presented as “Indira wave”, could also be seen as a continuation of this trajectory.

The nature of competitive politics changed quite significantly in post-Emergency period. The idiom of anti-Congressism translated into a new anti-establishment politics. The Janata Party, which was basically a grand coalition of various ideological-political forces, secured a comfortable majority by capitalising on over 41 % votes. Despite the fact that the Congress won 154 seats in this election, the Janata Party was able to demolish the symbolic dominance of Congress throughout the country. In other words, one might say that the anti-Congressism turned into anti-Indira electoral wave.  

The case of 1984 elections was slightly different. Congress’s prospects were much better during the last phase of the seventh Lok Sabha. The party had clearly established its control over Rajya Sabha and state assemblies. The assassination of Indira Gandhi just before the elections further consolidated the party’s position. Indira Gandhi was presented as an icon of sacrifice through audio-visual modes for the first time in the history of Indian elections. This reconstitution of public discourse in favour of young Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi contributed to Congress’s best electoral performance. The opposition to Congress was relegated to margin as Communist Party of India, which was the second largest party in the Lok Sabha, received just over 5 % votes and 22 seats.

These two examples reveal that the shrinking competitiveness in electoral politics, especially the virtual demise of opposition, could be identified as one of the factors which might turn a poll battle into an electoral wave. In 1977, Congress was not in a position to stop the electoral popularity of Janata Party; while in 1984, there was not any strong competitor to Rajiv Gandhi led Congress.                                               

The difference in voter turnout could also be taken as an important aspect for measuring an electoral wave. Voter turnout, we must note, is inextricably linked to the political enthusiasm of voters. In this sense, an electoral wave might signify a moment when people as voters get deeply involved in election process. An unprecedented increase in voter turnout in 1977 and 1984 respectively underlines the fact that the voters’ eagerness to participate in polls was comparatively much higher in these two elections. For instance, the anti-Indira sentiment led to a significant increase of over 5 % voter turnout in 1977 (in comparison to previous Lok Sabha election). Similarly, the Congress’s victory in 1984 might also be seen as a repercussion of a 7 % increase in voter turnout at the national level.

Finally, an electoral wave can also be evaluated by invoking the relative difference in vote share.  This factual yardstick might complicate our comparative picture. The 1977 election, in this sense, cannot be called a wave because the difference in vote share between the wining party and the runner up party was not very significant. On the contrary, the 1971 election turns out to be an electoral wave because the difference of vote share between the Congress and the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPM) was around 38 %. Yet, the 1984 election again emerges out as an electoral wave. The difference of vote share was an all-time high (around 44 %) in this election, which translated into 404 seats for the Congress.                

Let us come back to our main question: BJP’s victory as an electoral wave.  The electoral success of BJP, we must note, does not entirely wipe out the opposition. All India Anna Dravida Munetra Kazahagam (AIADMK) and Trinamool Congress’ (TMC) impressive victories in two key states; BJP’s reliability on National Democratic Alliance (NDA) partners for legislative purposes; rise of various state-level political players including the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP); Congress’s dominance in Rajya Sabha and in state assemblies remind us that competitive politics is still very powerful both at the national level as well as at the regional levels. On the other hand, more than 8 % increase in voter turnout in this election also signifies the fact that the electoral competition was very electric this time (though one cannot underestimate the impact of Modi-centric media campaign in this regard). Finally, the difference in vote-share between BJP and Congress is not very substantial (around 10 %).

Shall we dismiss the claim that BJP’s electoral appeal was actually a function of the Modi-wave? On the basis of this preliminary comparative assessment of Indian elections, BJP’s victory, does not seem to signify any electoral wave. However, we should not underestimate BJP’s remarkable performance in an era of coalition politics. The party has not merely secured 282 seats and formed the government; but it has also initiated a new form of alliance-politics with NDA partners. In this context, BJP’s victory and Modi-led campaign should be systematically examined at various levels. This kind of possibly nuanced exploration, I suggest, might help us in making sense of the explanatory value of the idea of an electoral wave in Indian context. 

Table: Elections for Lok Sabha Elections

* Winner’ means party with highest number of seats won

$ ‘Runner up’ means party with second highest number of seats won

$ Elections were held separately for States of Assam & Punjab

@ Elections were held separately for State of Punjab

(Source: Election Commission of India/CSDS Data Unit)