of the EC is most likely to weaken Brussels since each new adherent requires special concessions, cutting across the possibility of unified action. The CAP is not the model; it was possible to create it in a such smaller EC that was not a major participant in agricultural trade, and that led to a set of institutions and interests that permanently block serious reform. But is it conceivable that in a larger group, with greater involvement in external trade, that the heterogeneity of interests could allow unified action? Washington finds it difficult to balance the interests of, for example, chip-makers (who want to ban imports) and chip-users (who want the cheapest chips available); how much more extreme would be these issues in the much more varied mixture of the EC? Indeed, to gain unified action will require special concessions which in turn block the possibility of future unified action as well as administrative centralisation. It will be a ramshackle Byzantine structure, a complex of interests which will only rarely share a comon perspective. Furthermore, because of the complexity of interests
